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Give Serious Attention to Investigation and Study

- Some understanding from studying "Preface and Postscript to 'Rural Survey'"

by

Kung Hsiao-wen (宫效闻)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 5, May 18, 1975)

For us to give serious attention to investigation and study, and, in particular, for leading cadres to personally conduct investigation and study, is imperatively necessary for studying well the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the plane of integrating theory with practice and for developing the revolution in depth.

In studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is essential to persist in linking theory with practice and to eliminate the influence and manifestations of revisionism, including overcoming empiricism and dogmatism. But, how can we really do this? Chairman Mao has given us a profound yet plain generalization: "Shoot the arrow at the target." We do not study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat because we would look better in this way nor because we study for the sake of study. Rather, we study it because we must use the "arrow" -- the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- to shoot at the "target" -- the socialist revolution, and fulfill the task of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat right through every grassroots unit. In order to be able to "shoot the arrow at the target," we must understand the conditions. And to understand the conditions, the only way is to make social investigations. In his essay "Preface and Postscript to 'Rural Survey'" Chairman Mao points out: "For those charged with directing work, the basic method for knowing conditions is to concentrate on a few cities and villages according to a plan, use the fundamental viewpoint of Marxism, i.e., the method of class analysis, and make a number of thorough investigations. Only thus can we acquire even the most rudimentary knowledge of China's social problems." Therefore, fact-finding is an important way to study well the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat by linking theory with reality.

In studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must, guided by the Party's basic line, step by step and in a practical way create the conditions in which it will be impossible for the bourgeoisie to exist, or for a new bourgeoisie to arise. To accomplish this task, we must link theory with reality and not only read and study seriously and engage in arduous research but also attach importance to applying what we have learned in close association with reality. It would be a bad style of learning if we study not for the purpose of solving practical problems in revolutionary struggle but for the purpose of simply arguing it out over terms and concepts, and if, when attending meetings, we either talk volubly without hitting at the target or dwell on certain phenomena gathered here

and there. To make a success of our study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must rid ourselves of this bad style of learning and carry out investigation and study in a penetrating and meticulous manner and in conjunction with our theoretical study.

The Marxist theory of knowledge tells us that correct knowledge must be arrived at through a process of leaps -- practice, knowledge, again practice and again knowledge. Carrying out investigation and study in conjunction with studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat means that we must go deep into objective reality, systematize and synthesize lots of fragmentary, scattered and perceptual things and elevate them to the level of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to understand them. To this end, we must purposefully select one or two typical units, a brigade, a commune or a factory, and by the method of dissecting sparrows, appropriate the material in detail and then subject them to a scientific analysis and study on the basis of linking theory with practice. Take an example. Do you want to understand why, after the basic completion of the transformation of the system of ownership, it is still necessary to exercise all-round dictatorship of the proletariat in all areas and at all stages? Then, you must investigate one or two units in order to find out what changes and developments have taken place in various respects of the system of ownership, the relationship between the consolidation of the system of ownership and the problem of the line, why it is necessary to judge the system of ownership and leadership in reality and not in form, what incongruities still exist between the superstructure and the economic base as well as their effects on the nature of the system of ownership, etc. Take another example. Do you want to understand why some people within the working class follow the bourgeois style of life? Then, you must investigate one or two units in order to find out what changes have taken place within the working class in the course of its development, the conditions of the current class struggle, what channels are used by the bourgeoisie to corrupt and influence the workers, what characteristics and laws there are in this regard, and what are the class root-causes and social basis for the emergence of new bourgeois elements, etc. It is only when we carry out investigation and study in such a penetrating manner and master the material in detail that what we study will not be confined to concepts but will be extended to materials with flesh and blood and viewpoints, so that we may raise our existing level considerably.

"General investigation and study may enable us to discover and identify problems, but we still cannot solve them. To solve them, we must make systematic and elaborate investigation and do research, the process of analysis." Why is it that we often cannot solve the problems that have been brought up or can solve them only on the merits of each case? This is because, while the data of sense perception gathered from investigation reflect certain true facts of the external work, they are still one-sided, superficial and partial, not complete and essential things, and our knowledge still remains at the perceptual stage. To completely reflect the essence of the whole problem and to expose the inner connections of things, we must, guided by Marxist theory, do serious thinking and analysis, "reconstruct the rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross

and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside" so as to raise perceptual knowledge to the level of rational knowledge. The Marxist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat itself is founded on the basis of an analysis of the various classes in society, and we can truly understand and master it only if we conduct a serious analysis of the objective things from the viewoint of classes and class struggle. If we regard some data of sense perception gathered from investigation as the totality of the problem and are satisfied with a momentary gain or a narrow view, we shall neither attain the aim of investigation and study nor raise our consciousness of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The process of investigation and study is a process of learning from the masses. "One certainly cannot make an investigation, or do it well, without zeal, a determination to direct one's eyes downward and a thirst for knowledge, and without shedding the ugly mantle of pretentiousness and becoming a willing pupil." The masses are our teachers, and as their students, we have to be respectful and diligent and comradely in our attitude. Otherwise, if you do not shed the ugly mantle of pretentiousness and drop the bureaucratic air, they will stay away from you, will not pour out their hearts to you nor tell you what they know or tell you only some of it. In this sense, investigation and study is significant in restricting bourgeois right and breaking the caste concept. To shed the ugly mantle of pretentiousness, you must do things personally, hold a fact-finding meeting, ask questions and take notes and have discussions with those present. This is a good way to master first-hand information. It may be unjust to accuse some comrades of failing to make investigation, but their investigation scratches only the surface of the water. When the information reaches their hands, it has already become second- or even third-hand. These comrades seem to have a misconception--that after they have become leaders they need not conduct investigation and study personally and that in doing everything they can rely on clerks and reports, written or oral, from subordinates. Such ideas and practices are undesirable. Clerks are needed, and some of the things should also be done by them or subordinates, but it is impermissible for one to live on "ready-made meals." In the article "Preface and Postscript to 'Rural Survey'," Chairman Mao criticizes those who are reluctant to go deep into reality to make investigation and study personally. He points out: "No all-round knowledge can be acquired merely by glancing this way and that and listening to hearsay." At the same time, Chairman Mao deals with his own understanding of holding fact-finding meetings, saying that the materials concerning Hsingkuo county and Ch'angkang and Ts'aichi townships were obtained from fact-finding meetings. He praises the fact-finding meeting as "a better school than any university." This being the case, why can't some comrades do things personally, grasp one or two typical units, and conduct investigation and study with success?

Investigation and study is a Marxist scientific method. "Without practical investigation there will be idealist class appraisals and idealist guidance to work, and the result will either be opportunism or putschism." All opportunists are characterized by the split between the subjective and

the objective and the separation of knowledge from practice, and that is why they always desperately object to investigation and study. In "Preface and Postscript to 'Rural Survey'," Chairman Mao criticizes the "Left" opportunist Wang Ming for ridiculing investigation and study as "narrow empiricism," and reaffirms the materialist viewpoint that "he who makes no investigation has no right to speak." In 1964, Liu Shao-ch'i, in order to sabotage the socialist education movement, also openly attacked investigation and study encouraged by Chairman Mao as "out-dated," and put forward the idealist slogan "strike root and exchange experience." Therefore, in the current upsurge of studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must give serious attention to investigation and study by raising it to the level of the struggle between the two lines and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the time of the rectification campaign in Yenan, Chairman Mao had stated: "Carrying out the plan for investigation and study throughout the Party is a basic link for changing the Party's style of work." We should get hold of this "basic link" and earnestly conduct investigation and study in studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, changing the Party's style of work, and fulfilling the task of consolidating this dictatorship right through every grassroots unit.

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Smash the Bourgeois Intellectual Fetters

- Some understanding from studying the "Communist Manifesto"

by

Fang Hai (方海)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 5, May 18, 1975)

The mere mention of chains or fetters is apt to recall to mind the miserable life led by the toiling people of the old society, life that was worse than that of the beasts of burden with the three big mountains bearing on them. This idea comes into people's minds because they commonly associate fetters with class oppression and class exploitation. One revolutionary song runs: "Smash the iron chains and be set free! Shatter the fetters and be emancipated! Be emancipated!" Look, how the oppressed and exploited classes resent the fetters placed on them! For more than a century the Chinese people have struggled bravely, pressing ahead when those before them fell for the precise purpose of smashing these fetters so they can be set free today.

The fetters that symbolize class oppression and class exploitation have now been smashed by the people by means of revolution. However, some people among our ranks have been chained by another kind of bond, that is, by bourgeois intellectual fetters. For instance, some people whose positions have undergone changes are no longer able to keep the true features of a revolutionary. To show their "unequalled" status and a sense of "superiority" they always do something out of ostentation, such as choosing the best when coming to things like cigarettes, clothes or cars. In a word, some comrades have been so obsessed by the bourgeois idea of gradation which pervades their minds like invisible intellectual fetters that they think of nothing else but the pleasure and comfort of life, putting on the pompous airs of an official and divorcing themselves from the masses.

In the "Communist Manifesto," Marx and Engels pointed out: "The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas." Linked with what has been described above, we in particular realize the profound implications of their teachings. In the views of Marx and Engels, the "most radical rupture" with traditional property relations and traditional ideas encompass all the tasks of the proletarian revolution in terms of their actual content, these being interdependent and inseparable. To gain final emancipation the proletariat must therefore not only smash the iron chains of the system of exploitation but also the intellectual fetters of the bourgeoisie.

The gradation system is a product of private ownership. In primitive society the relationship between people was equal. They have been graded since there was a property system which produced class distinctions. Just as Marx and Engels pointed out in "Communist Manifesto": "In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social

rank." In order to maintain their own rule all exploiting classes invariably did their best to preserve this sytem of gradation. They fabricated all kinds of myths to picture gradation as an ideal system that would leave nothing more to be desired. Gradation was advocated by Confucius, who devoted his lifetime to upholding the rule of slave owners, declaring that "a prince should act like a prince, minister like minister, father like father, and son like son." He urged people to "look not at what is contrary to propriety and act not what is contrary to propriety." This means that gradation of social rank should be based on the "rules of conduct" prescribed by the slave-owning class, implying that conforming with the "rules of propriety" would be considered appropriate while not conforming with the "rules of propriety" an offense. The landlord class in feudal society turned the Confucian teaching into the reactionary doctrine of the "three bonds and five constant virtues," making this the criterion for handling all human relationships. Those who have read "The Dream of the Red Chamber" will recall one chapter describing ancestral offerings at Ningkuo House on the eve of the Chinese New Year as amounting literally to a demonstration of how rank was graded in feudal society. When the ritual was in progress, those who officiated at the ancestral worship rites and those who played a secondary role were so strictly prescribed that no trespassing of any kind could have occurred. Even the lowly servants must perform ancestral worship rites according to gradation of rank for the slaves. Amid the burning of incense sticks and the clanging of jade bracelets and pendants, the distinctions between the high and the low, noble and base, were clearly drawn. Furthermore, even dwellings, clothing and the manner of walking in feudal times must strictly conform with the individual's social rank. In capitalist society, however, class antagonisms have become less complicated. "Except for undisguised matters of interest and chilling 'cash deals' there is no other link between people." Although on the surface exchange on the basis of equal value is practiced in capitalist society, as if equality is accorded everybody, the greatest inequality is actually glossed over, that is, all are slaves to capital, with the capitalists personifying capital. In the hands of the capitalist, hunger replaces the whip held in the hands of slave and serf owners, imposing "open, despicable, direct and undisguised exploitation" on the workers and other toiling people. In capitalist society social rank, high or low, noble or base, is therefore always linked with capital or lack of it.

The proletarian revolution is different from all other revolutions in history. In "The Class Struggle in France, 1848-1850," Marx pointed out in clearcut terms: The dictatorship of the proletariat is aimed at eliminating all class distinctions and all relations of production engendered by these distinctions, wiping out all social relations conforming with these relations of production and transforming all ideas brought about by these social relations. All these that are to be eliminated naturally include the system of gradation that reflects class distinctions and the ideas derived from gradation. Within the revolutionary ranks of the proletariat, the gathering together of people toward a common revolutionary objective instead of basing on the exploitation and oppression of man by man, the relationship between people is that of equal and comradely relationship despite differences in duties and division of work. People who understand the history of our Party will know that our Party and the people's army it leads as well

as the revolutionary bases handled all relationships within the ranks of the people in accordance with this principle. Whether it is between the cadres and the masses, between the cadres themselves, between the higher and the lower and those on the right or left, the relationship between each other was handled by relying on truth, serving the people, and correct criticism and self-criticism, and not by relying on red tape and the bureaucratic routine, rebuffing, browbeating or bullying people. This principle of equality likewise found expression in material life. Although life was arduous during the years of revolutionary wars, people "fortunately were accustomed to hardships and everybody went through the same sort of difficulties." There were slight differences in living standard due to work requirements, such distinctions did not amount to much. In his work "The Struggle at Chingkangshan," Chairman Mao recalled: "Each was given only five cents daily for buying edible oil, salt, firewood and vegetables," with "army commanders down to couriers consuming five cents worth of food for their meals, cereals excepted." Everyone of us may have remembered seeing a picture of Chairman Mao making a report to the cadres at Yenan. In front of the grottos, Chairman Mao was wearing a suit made of coarse cotton cloth, with big patches on his trousers covering the ankles. A cup of tea was placed on a stool beside him. It was in such straitened circumstances that Chairman Mao intimately discussed revolutionary theory with the cadres. Proletarian leaders make a practice of sharing weal or woe with the broad masses of cadres and the rank and file. It is this new relationship injected with the communist factor that has enabled our Party, our army and our people to unite as one under the guidance of the correct line and to display the spirit of hard struggle so they can defeat powerful adversaries at home and abroad.

Unfortunately, those comrades who have been bound by bourgeois intellectual fetters have totally forgotten this glorious Party tradition. They have introduced the bourgeois practice of grading social rank into the Party and within the revolutionary ranks. They regard their status not as conditions for contributing more to the people but as capital for the pursuit of fame and gain from the Party and the people. Instead of regarding themselves as part of the masses of the people, they put on pompous airs, follow a bureaucratic routine, reprimand the rank and file whenever they feel like it, and are reluctant to treat people on equal terms. They do not look upon revolutionary work and job assignments as required by revolution but insist on becoming an official with no thought of acting like common people. Instances like these are too numerous to be cited. These comrades do not understand that the advance or turning back of the socialist system is closely linked with whether or not the interrelationship between people can be properly adjusted. If this interrelationship is impaired, there is a possibility of restoring the abolished bourgeois right in the area of ownership. Marxism has consistently held: "All our functionaries, regardless of their high or low positions, are servants of the people." Why should people, once they become cadres, claim special treatment and "consideration"? What makes these cadres think they could browbeat people as they please? Don't they think they cannot make revolution if they share weal or woe with the rank and file, like they did during the period of fighting battles? Some revolutionary cadres have put it well: Changes in one's status in no way should

cause any change in his attitude toward serving the people, in the style of hard struggle, in the revolutionary spirit of suffering first and enjoying the comfort of life later. This is the true feature that identifies a revolutionary.

Of course,we do not deny that socialist society is still in the preliminary stage of communism. There are still a host of inequalities that exist in the relationship between people and in distribution. The reason why these signs cannot as yet be quickly removed over a very long period of time to make way for distribution according to needs is that socialist society "just emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges." But Marxism recognizes the inevitable appearance of bourgeois right for the precise purpose of restricting and eliminating it. As regards the idea of bourgeo right, including the idea of grading social rank, it is a reflection in ideology of bourgeois right in the service of upholding bourgeois right. The more thoroughly the ideas pertaining to bourgeois right are uprooted, the more forcefully bourgeois right will be restricted. However, those who are enfettered by the concept of bourgeois right hide themselves in a snail's shell and refuse to come out. They believe that since bourgeois right is something that exists it must be rational. They contend that this should be safeguarded and widened instead of being eliminated. They put around their own necks what clearly are bourgeois intellectual fetters, as an ornament to win public approval and to embellish themselves. They adorn themselves with what clearly are the "birthmarks" of capitalist society to flaunt their "unique" status. Like the so-called "high-class Chinese" in the old society, they would not be able to show their gentlemanly dignity without wearing Western style clothes and leather shoes and uttering words like "yes" or "no." These people have simply discarded such things as the principles of the Paris Commune, the working style of plain living and hard struggle, not being divorced from the masses or labor, restricting bourgeois right, and so on.

In "Communist Manifesto," Marx and Engels pointed out: "The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority." Working for the interests of the vast majority is the hallmark that distinguishes the proletarian revolution from revolutions carried out by all exploiting classes. Only by emancipating the whole of mankind can the proletariat finally liberate itself. As an individual member of the proletariat, particularly as an advanced element and cadre of this class, he should therefore refrain from doing anything that departs from the class as a whole and from the special interests of the vast majority, let along placing personal interests above those of the vast majority. The idea of private ownership is the core of the bourgeois system of gradation. The reason why some people have carried over bourgeois caste concept within the Party and ins the revolutionary ranks is that they are still imbued with the lingering idea of private ownership when joining the Party and taking part in the revolution. At the outset of the revolution, perhaps these people were in favor of restricting and eliminating bourgeois right, which at that time had not brought them any gain. However, once their status has changed

and the moment they think they have the necessary conditions for using bourgeois right to build and feather their own "nests," they begin to find bourgeois stuff endearing and call the revolution to a halt. People of this type engaged in revolution resemble those, in Lu Hsün's words, "fighting merely for an old chair. Pushing this chair seems abominable but getting it evokes the feeling of having something to be treasured and identifies oneself with what is 'old.'" Historical experience proves that if those who have been seriously obsessed with the concept of bourgeois right do not conscientiously study Marxism and strive to transform their world outlook in the course of revolution, they will find the bourgeois intellectual fetters tightening and weighing down on them, egoism becoming more and more inflated, and possibly placing themselves in positions opposed to that of the Party and the people. Shouldn't our comrades guard themselves against repeating the same mistakes made in the past?

The history of proletarian dictatorship tells us that smashing the intellectual fetters represented by the concept of bourgeois right is an important aspect of restricting bourgeois right, resisting the bourgeois life style, combating and preventing revisionism, and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the wake of the great cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, our Party has smashed the conspiratorial attempts of swindlers like Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao of using bourgeois right to restore capitalism. It has carried out a series of revolutions in various realms from the economic base to the superstructure encompassing, for instance, a complete set of Marxist principles for running enterprises,* the system of cadre participation in collective productive labor, upholding the "May 7" road indicated by Chairman Mao by the vast numbers of cadres and different professions and trades, and educated youths going to mountainous and rural areas. All these are of far-reaching significance for restricting bourgeois right, uprooting ideas related to bourgeois right including the concept of grading social rank, adjusting the interrelationships among the people, preventing the emergence of new bourgeois elements, bringing about a revolutionization of cadres' thinking, and keeping to the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, we must take note of the fact that like the flies and mosquitoes in the old society which have not been completely wiped out, the stinking odor emitted by the bourgeois concept of grading social rank has not been completely dispelled. Instead, "it rots and stinks among us, contaminating the air and poisoning our life and besieging from all sides the fresh, young and vibrant things with decayed and moribund stuff." Similarly, a handful of class enemies invariably use the idea of bourgeois right to corrode our Party members and cadres, making them lord it over the people and undermining the cordial relations between the Party and the masses of the people. Remnants of old ideas that reflect the old order invariably tend to linger on for a long period of time in people's minds, unwilling to vanish of themselves. Therefore, among a section of the working class, a section of Party members, and among the state functionaries as well, the bourgeois life style has reared its head. This state of affairs in no way should be neglected by us, nor should we drop our guard.

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* "Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company"

In his reference to the Communist obligatory labor on Saturdays, Lenin compared the old force of habit, old practices and old traditions and concepts of the bourgeoisie to "an incomparably big and weighty mountain." Although the big mountain of the bourgeoisie still towers before us today, we have after all begun to move it. As long as we possess the spirit of the foolish old man removing the mountains, keep "digging into the mountain" without cease, and upholding the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we can surely and finally overturn this big mountain. "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."

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A Tentative Discussion of the Class Relations of Social-Imperialism

by

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(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 4, April 16, 1975)

Great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "Socialist society covers a fairly long historical stage. In this historical stage of socialism, there still are classes, class contradiction and class struggle, the struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads, the danger of a capitalist restoration." A capitalist restoration appears in the Soviet Union, the first socialist state of the world, its transition to social imperialism, apart from international factors, being mainly the product of internal class struggle inside the Soviet Union, the result of bourgeois representatives within the Soviet Party having usurped supreme party and political powers and turned the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Summing up the historical lesson from the restoration of proletarian dictatorship to bourgeois dictatorship in the Soviet Union and examining the social class relations of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is of vital practical significance for knowing the reactionary essense of social-imperialism and for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing capitalist restoration in our country.

After the victory of the October Revolution the Soviet Union established the dictatorship of the proletariat under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. Subsequent nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture strengthened the socialist system. However, the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the struggle between the socialist and capitalist roads continue to exist for a long period of time, thus providing the soil for preserving and regenerating the bourgeoisie. After completing the processes of nationalizing industry and collectivizing agriculture, the struggle between socialism and capitalism has not ended because of the successful transformation of the ownership system. Although the overthrown bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes have been deprived of the means of production, they are still around and will certainly try in every possible way to regain their lost "paradise." Inevitably the petty bourgeoisie undergoing reform retain the spontaneous capitalist tendencies, the resultant polarization conducive to the engendering of new bourgeois elements. In view of the corrosion and besieging of bourgeois and petty bourgeois political ideas and the influence of the force of habit of the old society, particularly the inevitable existence of bourgeois right in distribution and exchange, degenerate elements and new bourgeois elements will be constantly engendered among the ranks of the working class and Communist Party members as well as among Party and government organizations. The engendering of new bourgeois intellectuals will likewise take place in cultural and educational departments. When these new bourgeois and degenerate elements join with the old bourgeois elements and members of the other exploiting classes, they are likely to form a rather massive

social force for the restoration of capitalism. The persistent activity of this social force once prompted the Soviet party and government to combat it without letup. In the late 1930's and mid-1940's, for instance, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) on two separate occasions decided to recover more than 2½ million and 4.7 million hectares of public land of the collective farms that had been illegally expropriated by private individuals (some had been sold or leased), apart from recovering large amounts of livestock, food and money that had been corruptly mishandled and stolen. According to a report of the CPSU Central Committee at its 19th Congress held in 1952, the leadership of some party organizations, corrupted by the bourgeois style of life, "placed the interests of their small groups above those of the party and the state." Among socialist enterprises the pursuit of profit, resorting to capitalist operations as well as corruption and cases of theft continued to rise, with the leadership of some industrial enterprises "even trying to turn these undertakings into their hereditary domains." The functionaries of some other party and government organizations "made no attempts to protect the interests of the public-owned economy of the collective farms and instead helped themselves to the property of the collective farms."

When the bourgeoisie has developed its economic strength to a certain extent, its agents would demand political domination, the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and a wholesale transformation of the socialist system of public ownership, openly restoring and developing the capitalist system. In the protracted class struggle in the Soviet Union the bourgeoisie invariably devised ways and means to turn their restoration hopes into restorationist actions. New bourgeois elements in particular, colluding with the old bourgeois elements in society and never stopping to obtain by illegal means the leadership power of some departments, increasingly degenerated into the privileged bourgeois category and politically became bourgeois agents. The Khrushchev-Brezhnev revisionist clique was the general representative of capitalist forces in Soviet society. Stalin once liquidated a very large number of counter-revolutionary bourgeois representatives who had wormed their way into the Party. As the first state of proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet Union however was inexperienced in handling the questions of how to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent capitalist restoration. In these circumstances people like Khrushchev who excelled in double-dealing hid themselves within the Soviet Communist Party. Taking advantage of Stalin's death, they resorted to surprise attacks by dishing up a "secret report" to maliciously slander Stalin. This was followed by the use of sinister and cunning tactics to usurp the Soviet Union's supreme Party and government powers. After the Soviet revisionist renegade clique had completed its usurpation, it began to expand considerably the political and economic powers of the Soviet bourgeoisie. With leadership power over various realms and departments in the hands of the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie in control of the entire state apparatus and social wealth, a new type of big bourgeois class came into being. This bureaucratic and monopolist class thus has become the class base of Soviet social-imperialism. With the degeneration of proletarian dictatorship into big bourgeois dictatorship, the socialist economy in the Soviet Union has likewise degenerated into the monopolistic capitalist economy of the

state. The handful of bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie headed by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, in control of the entire state machinery and monopolizing all basic means of production and social products, ruthlessly oppress and exploit all the working people in the Soviet Union.

Prior to a capitalist restoration, the Soviet working class through the state of proletarian dictatorship had access to the means of production and established the state-owned economy based on the socialist system of ownership by the whole people. In the wake of changes in the character of state power in the Soviet Union, the nature of the state-operated economy has likewise changed, from the socialist system of ownership by the whole people to the bureaucratic and monopolistic capitalist system of ownership. Among state-operated enterprises in the Soviet Union today, managers appointed by the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie assume overall powers over enterprises, "carrying out enterprise management on the basis of a one-chief system." Managers have the power to "possess, use and dispose of" assets belonging to the enterprise, to "lease," "transfer" and "sell" those means of production left "idle." In addition, managers are authorized to determine the "organizational structure" of enterprises concerned, having the option to "hire and lay off the working staff." It is legally specified that managers have the option to annul employment contracts and terminate the services of workers on "grounds" such as the "abolition of organizations," "retrenchment of personnel" or "incompetence" of employees, their physical fitness and illness for a period of more than four months. Moreover, managers have the power to "adopt measures for rewarding or punishing the working personnel of the enterprise," having such options as determining the conditions and amounts of wage increases and bonuses for workers, reducing their wages or depriving them of bonuses, organizing "comrades' arbitration meetings," dismissing and expelling the workers (including surrender of their labor manuals) and turning them over to the judicial organs. On the other hand, the workers have the "obligation" to "abide by labor discipline and internal regulations" and do their jobs submissively. All this shows that Soviet workers are no longer the masters in handling the relationships governing the means of production, with the relations of production among Soviet state-operated enterprises no longer those of the socialist type. The relationship between the handful of bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeois elements of the privileged class and the vast numbers of employees is entirely one between the employer and the employee, between the ruler and the ruled.

The ownership system as practiced by the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie among Soviet state-operated enterprises determines that production is aimed at obtaining the maximum amount of profits. The Soviet Party Constitution clearly stipulates the need to "increase the profitability of production." Soviet revisionist leaders have time and again declared that "profits and the rate and level of profits should form the objective basis for assessing enterprise operations." They unabashedly identified their "main line of economic development" as bringing more income out of every ruble invested. To grab the maximum amount of profits they gave rein to the "Shekino(谢基诺) experiment" and

"scientific labor organizations" in the name of the "new economic system," a "scientific" system for extending the plundering of the workers. Resorting to ruthless and deceitful means, they most rapaciously exploited the workers, helped themselves to the enormous amount of wealth created by the workers through such media as profits and tax money. They also seized the Soviet people's fruits of labor by means of high wages and high bonuses, apart from a host of extra income. According to greatly compressed official material, the average rate of surplus value in the Soviet industry reached as high as over 200 percent.

Under the condition of the Soviet proletarian dictatorship having been replaced by big bourgeois dictatorship and the ownership system of the socialist state degenerated into the ownership system of the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie, the cooperative system of the collective farm has likewise become the capitalist system. As a kind of economic organization, the collective farm's character is determined by the "content embodied in this form -- with the question arising first of all in who shall preside over and exercise leadership over the collective farm." ("On Rural Work," Complete Works of Stalin, Vol. XIII) People picked by the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie now run the collective farms. According to rules and regulations on the collective farm dished up by the Soviet revisionists, the chairman of the collective farm is empowered to handle and dispose of the farm's property and funds, such as selling farm machines and other means of production, fixing the farmhands' labor remuneration and bonuses, leasing or transferring the farm's public land, exploiting wage labor in a disguised form, and punishing farmhands by resorting to administrative and economic measures until they are disqualified. Riding roughshod over the peasants, they "do what they please." The chairman of one collective farm "promulgated within a year more than a hundred disciplinary decrees, subjecting one out of every four farmhands to punishment." According to disclosures made by Soviet revisionist publications, the chairman of the farm regards the peasant as "playing the role of a whip," "with nobody paying any attention to the farmhands." The latter must abide by an assortment of so-called "discipline" and "rules and regulations." The slightest symptoms of recalcitrance would subject the offenders to a host of "charges" and disciplinary actions such as job reassignments, reduced income, layoffs and dismissals. Soviet news media claim that only the "experts" having knowledge of science and technology are the "pillars" of agriculture and that "real peasants" no longer are the "masters of the land." After undergoing this kind of "transformation" all the operations of the collective farm are placed under the direct control of the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie, with the economy of the collective farm becoming an integral part of the monopolistic capitalist economy of the state.

Through direct control of the entire state apparatus the bureaucratic monopolist bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union have cornered all the basic means of production, controlled the whole national economy and carried out distribution according to the size of capital and power. This has reduced "distribution according to work" to an external shell, making it possible for the handful of new bourgeois elements who have monopolized the means of production to exercise the sole distributio

power regarding consumer items and other products. Armed with vast political and economic powers, they take advantage of these powers to obtain handsome incomes and special treatment beyond the reach of ordinary people. According to foreign publications, the monthly pay of a marshal of the Soviet army ranges from 2,000 to 3,000 rubles, equivalent to as much as US$50,000 per year if expenses borne by the government are also included. "Like Politburo members and those of the Secretariat, Brezhnev and others are eligible to having an 'open expense account' in the national bank, entitling the account holder to draw and spend as much as he pleases." This band of people depend entirely on robbing the state treasury to live lavishly. To satisfy the extravagant needs of a handful of the biggest bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeois elements, the government has set up special shops known as "special warehouses" where different kinds of high-class commodities and luxury goods imported from the West are kept. Inside the Kremlin, along Glanovsko (格拉诺夫斯科汝) Street, in the neighborhood of the National Defense Ministry on Frunze Street, and in the vicinity of Estladang (埃斯特拉登) Theater near Kamani (卡门尼) Bridge, for instance, shops of this type are provided. Other special stores offering less pretentious goods cater to officials in charge of various government departments, service chiefs, as well as Party, government and military personnel at different levels. These special shops are closed to ordinary Soviet people, setting them apart from those who are provided with magnificent and luxuriously furnished mansions and villas, sedans and sports cars for their exclusive use, as well as facilities for recreation, hunting and fishing.

Apart from their "legitimate" incomes and treatment, this handful of bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeois elements take advantage of the immense powers they have usurped to carry out assorted plunderings. For example, the former Soviet Minister of Culture purchased through official channels large quantities of building materials for the purpose of building a villa worth US$170,000. In 1973, officials in Tbilisi, capital of Georgia divided among themselves the land set aside for a "collective" garden and made use of government supplies to build a hothouse. "Pravda" had to admit that this kind of "hothouse" was no different from private luxury villas,numbering as many as 989 in this republic.

To foster and build bourgeois influence, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has instituted a wage/class system differentiating different levels of leadership personnel from the ordinary worker and peasant masses. Taking advantage of privileges and official benefits and making use of high wages, high bonuses and innumerable sources of income, they are in possession of part of the surplus value. Many of them have been engaged in speculation and profiteering, corruption and theft, clandestine operations and embezzlement to deprive the workers and peasants of their fruits of labor. According to relevant materials, leading personnel such as managers, factory directors and chief engineers are paid as much as a dozen or scores of times more than the workers. In addition to their salaries, the privileged strata uses their influence and positions to obtain various kinds of supplementary remunerations and preferential treatment. Bonuses received by the leading personnel of enterprises on a pro rata basis are more than those for the workers, since the

former's salaries and bonuses are very high. Moreover, the managers of enterprises have the power to set the conditions for and determine the amounts of bonuses, thus making it possible for them to get larger bonuses. The manager of Lipeisk (利佩茨克) Industrial Building Trust, received bonuses seven times in a month, totally 1,375 rubles. The bonuses issued to the managerial staff of Komir (戈米尔) Glass Works in one quarter made up 147.2 percent of their payroll. Sometimes a leader's "birthday" was given as "reason" for getting bonuses.

According to the 1970 regulations promulgated by the Soviet revisionist authorities, the fixed monthly pay of the chairman and general expert of the collective farm could be as much as 300 rubles. But according to disclosures made by Soviet publications, the leadership personnel of many farms in fact fixed alarmingly high salaries for themselves. For instance, the average monthly pay of the chairman of Lenin Collective Farm in Tanailei (大纳雷) district of Eastern Kazakh was 582 rubles, that of the chief agronomist and chief livestock supervisor 428 rubles, that of the chief accountant 448 rubles. The average monthly pay of the chairman of Konpur (江布尔) Collective Farm in Marken (麦尔肯) district of Konpur (江布尔) was 515 rubles, that of the chairman of Aliyev (阿利耶夫) Collective Farm in Azerbaidzhan Republic 448 rubles. But the wages of manual laborers at that Farm amounted to only one-seventh to one-fifth of the pay for the chairman of the farm. The average monthly pay of the principal expert of a farm in Alamatu was six times the wages of ordinary farmhands. According to regulations, the chairman of the collective farm and others are given bonuses as much as 40-50 percent of their fixed monthly salaries. The chairman of the collective farm and others can also fix the amounts of the bonuses as they please. For instance, the chairman of Ilich Memorial Collective Farm, Kaching (加青) district of Leningrad, was "awarded" two months pay in recognition of his 20 years of "effective" leadership over the farm. The completion of a club in that farm was reason for awarding the chairman 588 rubles. Both his son, the farm's chief engineer, and wife, supervisor of the farm's motor pool, were entitled to doubled vacation and traveling expenses, as well as bonuses and extra income under different names.

Salaries and bonuses are not the only sources of income for the privileged group. Many leading personnel of enterprises and farms resort to every conceivable means to commit corruption and theft, oppression of the people. The person responsible for the construction of the underground railway in Baku misappropriated more than 3,000 rubles worth of allocated materials. The person in charge of the Department for the Installation and Administration of Oil Equipment corruptly obtained a house covering 550 square meters and a villa provided with a swimming pool. By falsifying an employee roster, the director of Armenia Sports Goods Manufacturing Factory took away dishonestly US$3,400. Blackmarket deals earned an official of a plastics plant in Azerbaidzhan a huge income of US$215,000. Under the excuse of disposing of surplus products, the leaders of Riga Textile Company corruptly sold ten tons of scarce woollen yarn. The leadership of many tobacco plantations in Georgia "stole material wealth amounting to millions of rubles." Acting in collusion with the responsible

personnel of No. 15 Trust of the Ministry of Building, certain leaders of this republic's construction bank helped themselves to and made away with 82,705 rubles. The director and the Party secretary of a state fruit farm in Kazakhstan seized two and a half hectares of residential plots and hired workers to run an orchard. Wages for labor were paid for by the state farm but the two collected all the proceeds amounting to thousands of rubles from the sale of the yield.

Through payments of high salaries, high remunerations for articles written, high bonuses as well as corrupt practices and thefts, the privileged bourgeois class obtains large amounts of money as their income and lives in extravagance. The manager of the Kazakh Building Materials and Couplings Company built a two-story "Goethe-type" private residence in a very short time, a house that "practically resembles the mansion of a nobleman." Building villas and private residences has been a prevailing tendency in Kazakh republic, with all the leaders in Alikseyev (阿列克谢耶夫) "having their own homes." By helping himself to building materials belonging to a farm in Armenia and exploiting the labor of farmhands, the chairman of that farm built a high-class villa for himself. Occupying an area of 616 square meters, the house is complete with a fountain in the garden and solid walls all around, the farm chairman's pretentious three-story house being visible even at a long distance. To celebrate his re-election, the chairman of the above-mentioned Ilich Memorial Collective Farm lavishly entertained more than 300 guests, transportation expenses for the invited guests in 1971 alone costing the farm more than 12,000 rubles. In addition, the farm spent 1,300 rubles on the making of a special film "extolling the activity of the chairman of this collective farm." Another collective farm in Tatar autonomous republic reserved three sedans and one open motorcar for the exclusive use of the farm's chairman, serving in fact as his private convoy.

On the other hand, bourgeois intellectuals assigned to cultural, educational, scientific and technological departments likewise serve as the class base of Soviet revisionist social imperialism. These members of the intellectual nobility, lording it over the laboring people, also wield vast powers and have access to special treatment. Enjoying high salaries, large amounts of remuneration for articles written and other sources of extra income, they share part of the surplus value and live in luxury. The fixed monthly pay of the fellows of the Soviet Academy of Sciences ranges from 1,500 to 2,000 rubles. Adding the nominal posts they hold and remuneration for articles they write, their actual monthly income is in the region of 3,000 rubles. The monthly pay of a university professor is 2,500 rubles, that of a film actor 450 rubles. Adding an extra monthly income of 2,000 rubles, the latter's actual income is 2,450 rubles. Furthermore, in the name of giving away cash awards, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique every year distributes to these intellectual noblemen the surplus value it has exploited. One cash award surreptitiously attributed to Lenin amounted to 10,000 rubles, with national cash awards of a general nature amounting to as much as 5,000 rubles each. According to relevant material, the annual salary of the president of the Moscow Medical Institute is US$30,000. Adding the consultation fees he collects from his private clinic, his yearly

income is about US$100,000-200,000. The annual income of a cardiologist in private practice is US$400,000. A writer named Solokov (肖洛霍夫) is a very rich man owning a private villa, a private plane as well as private property in considerable quantities. The magnificent mansion of a prominent ballet-dancer in the Soviet Union boasts of gardens and terraces, an "elegantly tiled bathroom that virtually resembles the bathroom in the White House." These intellectual noblemen also enjoy the privileges of buying high-class consumer goods from special shops and of traveling abroad, apart from having the right to enter special clubs and recreation grounds closed to the general public.

A "hereditary" system in a disguised form has been instituted for the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie and intellectual nobility in the Soviet Union. "Many of them pass on to their children the benefits derived from power." According to "customary practice," they "can arrange for their children any job in any place they wish to work." They regard the university as the ladder for their children's ascent to the position held by the new bourgeoisie. Soviet universities open their doors to the children of this privileged class. According to material emanating from Soviet revisionist "Scholars," the proportion of worker-peasant attendance among the students of schools of higher learning in Sverdlovsk run on a full-day basis dropped from 59.6 percent in 1964 to 49.3 percent in 1969. Similarly, the proportion of peasants and their children among students attending correspondence sections of these schools likewise dropped sharply from 25.3 percent in 1959 to 0.6 percent in 1969.

The bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie and the privileged strata among the bourgeoisie comprise the main body of the Soviet bourgeoisie in the present. Related in different ways to them are other capitalist forces in Soviet society, such as the capitalists, landowners, rich peasants, noblemen, Russian generals and church officers overthrown during the socialist revolution. These comprised 4.6 percent of the Soviet population at the time, about 7 million people, according to the 1928 statistics. Since the 1930's no figures relating to this aspect have ever been published. But as a class they still exist, becoming active again under the rule of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. New capitalists operating underground factories, underground building firms and underground shops, new rich peasants who cultivate plots between residences with hired labor, and upstarts becoming rich through speculative operations in the free market, mainly the products of spontaneous capitalist forces, have become the new rich. Like the overthrown old exploiting classes, they are an ally of the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union. Moreover, worker-noblemen who have followed the bourgeois way comprise mainly those so-called "labor heroes" and "workers' representatives" bought over by the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie with large amounts of bonuses and inducements (such as better accommodation and travels at official expense). All these bourgeois and exploiting classes total less than 5 percent of the Soviet population, that is, less than 10 million (5 to 7 million in Western estimates). They form the social base of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, the "high society holding power" in the Soviet Union today.

Under the rule of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique the workers, peasants and other toiling people comprising over 90 percent of the Soviet population down the lowest social strata are on the contrary in the enslaved and exploited position. They are no longer the masters of the state and of enterprises. With nothing left, they can only survive by selling their labor power and lead a life of increasing poverty.

According to official Soviet material, the average annual rate of wage increases from 1960 to 1973 was 4 percent, with the average yearly rise of the so-called "national economic currency accumulation," that is, the profits of and turnover tax for state-operated enterprises, during the corresponding period registering more than 8 percent, of which the rate of increase of profits making up about 11.5 percent. The increased exploitation of the workers and staff caused their incomes to drop steadily in terms of the proportion of the national income. It must be pointed out here that the so-called average wage scale which had taken into calculation the salaries for the Soviet bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeois elements and the privileged bourgeois class thus inflated the average wage levels for the workers in general. As a matter of fact, the average wages of the workers were much lower than the official figures, in many cases the workers' pay rises having been offset by the rising commodity prices. The wage levels of the overwhelming majority of Soviet employees were below the average wages, with more than half of the workers classifiable in the low wage category. Take the wages of those employed by machine manufacturers in Leningrad as an example. Among those earning on the average less than 120 rubles on the basis of the 1970 wage level, 66.8 percent comprised "non-skilled laborers," 92.6 percent were "non-manual laborers possessing medium skill," 43.5 percent were "principally skilled laborers engaged in machine making and mechanical operations," and 29.6 percent were "mainly skilled handicraft workers." Although the two latter categories of personnel generally belong to skilled workers on higher wage scales, nearly one half or one-third of the employees earn less than the average wage levels. Leningrad is a big city where the cost of living and wage levels are rather high, the machine manufacturers being among those sectors paying rather high wages. Judging from the Soviet Union as a whole, the proportion of those workers and the general category of employees whose wage levels are below the average wages becomes greater.

According to the 1967 material compiled by the Soviet Institute of Labor Science, a standard family of four members (two working adults and two children) on the average required 51.4 rubles per person per month to maintain the essential living standard. However, the wages and incomes (including bonuses) of many workers and the general category of employees in the Soviet Union at present have not reached this level. For instance, among those employed by machine manufacturers in Leningrad in early 1970, computed on the basis of their average family monthly incomes that were below 50 rubles, 13.7 percent comprised "non-skilled laborers," 18.6 percent were "non-manual laborers possessing medium skill," 11.3 percent were "skilled workers mainly engaged in physical labor in machine works and mechanical operations," and altogether 14.3 percent were those "skilled workers mainly engaged in physical labor and

handicraft." Of these four categories of employees, respectively 2.1 percent, 1.1 percent, 0.8 percent and 0.8 percent of the family members on the average earned less than 30 rubles each. More than 63 percent of Soviet workers are now paid the lowest wages, with those earning less than 51.4 rubles per person per month in that country making up the vast majority of workers families. It has been officially admitted that 25 million people, that is, over 10 percent of the Soviet population or approximately one-fifth of the urban populations, are in need of relief because these families on the average earn less than 50 rubles per person per month.

In the Soviet Union today if a worker or any of the general category of employees loses his labor power his income will be pitiful. Not until July 1, 1971 was the minimum amount of pensions raised from 30 to 45 rubles. The numbers of employees depending on pensions for their subsistence rose from 40 million in 1970 to 42 million in 1972, going up to 43 million in early 1973. Since the amount of pensions was not enough to maintain their living, many aging and feeble pensioners were forced to go to work again. According to published disclosures, "the number of pensioners re-employed during the period from 1966 to 1971 rose from 14 to 21 percent."

A salient aspect of the impoverishment of the Soviet working class and the steady deterioration of their condition has been the persistent and vast "flow of labor power" in the Soviet Union. In the past years this "flow of labor power" has reached enormous dimensions. According to disclosures made in a Soviet journal "Successor," the manpower flow among Soviet industries and construction projects in the past years reached the 10 million figure each year, averaging a "flow" of 28 days per person each time. In other words, more than a million workers every year were either idle or unemployed. Adding the numbers of drifters in other departments, roughly two million people throughout the Soviet Union are either idle or unemployed every year, indicating the rather extensive "flow of labor power." The flow of workers among industrial enterprises in 1972 comprised 19.8 percent of the average number of those on the payroll. This preponderant "flow of labor power" thus characterizes the Soviet revisionist renegade clique's allout efforts to restore capitalism and turn the Soviet Union into a new type of social imperialist state dominated by the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie. The latter class is naturally in favor of massive staff cutbacks in order to obtain the largest possible profits. For instance, 23 percent of the employees of Shekino (谢基诺) Allied Chemical Works had been either laid off or sent away for enlistment, indicating that nearly one out of four was expelled from the plant. Except for 4.75 percent of the retrenched staff who enlisted in the army, most of the remainder joined the ranks of the manpower flow. Following the introduction of a "new system" in five car firms in Moscow and Leningrad, altogether 239 employees were laid off in five months. To obtain greater profits, the manager of a truck repair plant in Moscow terminated the services of 10 percent of the factory workers. Soviet laws empower the leadership of enterprises to lay off workers for no reason at all. Leading personnel of enterprises "expel people not acceptable to them."

They "dismiss those who are critical of their superiors for no reason at all." "Anything can be cited as grounds for punishing the workers." "Slandering the leadership," "not letting people work in peace" and even "violating the Marriage Law" may cause the workers to be expelled from the factory. Some of the employees dismissed by Kropiyan (克罗布杨), director of No. 2 Ferrous Metals Bureau, Armenia republic, for instance, lost their jobs for their hostile stance; some were asked to go because they were not related to him; some were laid off because his grandchildren wanted the jobs. The complement of staff for this bureau was fixed at 62, but in 15 months since he became director of the bureau he had hired and fired 79 employees. Cases like dismissing employees at will during 1970 comprised 60 percent of those involving labor-management conflicts over employment in Azerbaidzhan republic.

The so-called "flow of labor power" in the Soviet Union is no different from the production reserves that exist universally in capitalist society. Marx said, "The excess population of workers becomes a production reserve army that can be handled. It is absolutely subordinate to capital as if it has been brought up by capital. This excess population of workers is not subject to the actual growth limits of population and provides the constantly changing needs of capital gains with exploitable human physical material." This is so with the Soviet Union under the rule of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. On the one hand, tens of thousands of employees unacceptable to them are kicked out of the factory gates. On the other hand, more than 250 official labor outlets -- "labor employment bureaus" or "employment agencies -- have been set up throughout the land, in cities with a population in excess of 100,000. These outlets recruit cheap labor power for enterprises requiring manpower and collect commissions for this service. In the eyes of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, the working class is nothing but mercenary slaves selling their labor power.

Like the workers, farmhands are subjected to all kinds of exploitation and oppression, toiling all the year round in exchange for meager "labor remuneration." Although the average monthly income of farmhands in 1972 was about 80 rubles, according to official material published in the Soviet Union, the average monthly remuneration in many farms was much lower than this level. For instance, one workday's remuneration in some farms is less than 1½ rubles. This monthly average of only 28 rubles, computed on the basis of the average monthly work attendance of 18.8 days in force throughout the Soviet Union, is far lower than previous averages. The vast numbers of ordinary farmhands engaged in animal power and manual work in big fields are likewise paid low wages. On the basis of the average figures for collective farms in the Soviet Union, the annual income of farmhands engaged in animal power and manual work in big fields in 1969 amounted to about 500 rubles, or approximately 41 rubles per month. Many farmhands were in fact not paid as much. For example, according to rulings then in force, the lowest wage scale for those engaged in animal power and manual work in state farms was 1.72 rubles per day. Computed on the basis of the standard monthly work attendance of 18.8 days, the monthly remuneration of farmhands performing similar jobs in collective farms would then amount to only 32.3

rubles. This predominant category of farmhands generally comprises 54-70 percent of all farmhands.

The income of farmhands in terms of the average sizes of their families is also very low. Compared with the families of factory workers, the 1963 average stood at 58 percent. Compared with employee families in the national economic sector, the 1969 percentage was 69. The income of farmhands derived from the social consumer fund, computed on the basis of the per capita averages, was one-third of the employee's. Prior to 1967, there was no social insurance provisions for farmhands. Although a social insurance scheme underwritten by the farms was later introduced, the standard was very low. The minimum amount of pensions was only raised, effective July 1, 1971, from the monthly rate of 12 rubles to 20. Allowances for the disabled due to work accidents or occupational diseases ranged from the minimum monthly fixed sum of 35 rubles for the first grade, 25 rubles for the second grade, 16 rubles for the third grade. Allowances for the disabled due to illness of a general nature ranged from the minimum fixed sum of 30 rubles for the first grade and 20 rubles for the second grade. The minimum monthly prescribed limit of pensions for families without means of support was 30 rubles for those having three or more members without labor power, 20 rubles for those having two members without labor power, and 16 rubles for those having one member without labor power. This low rate of pensions can hardly maintain the living of the individual.

Brutal oppression and exploitation resulted in massive exodus of farmhands. According to published statistics, the number of farmhands during the 1960-70 period was reduced by about 1.8 million (not including those retrenched when farms were run by the state). According to figures published in a Soviet journal, from 1959 to 1970 altogether 16,400,000 villagers drifted to the cities, averaging 1.5 million people a year. In recent years this exodus has been on the rise, numbering 2 million a year. This massive outflow, particularly the drifting of young people to the cities, "has contributed to the rapid aging of those members of collective farms with labor power." "In some places the average age of those engaged in farming is 50," while "women in production perform about two-thirds of labor that is unsuitable for them." In the face of this dismal outlook in the Soviet countryside, Soviet revisionist chieftains have called for efforts to increase the "attractions of the rural villages" and to "foster the peasants' love of the land." However, their desperate outbursts and rantings serve no good purpose since the collective farms as they are today no longer belong to the Soviet peasants themselves.

More than 20 years of domination by the Khrushchev-Brezhnev renegade clique have intensified the contradictions between the vast numbers of worker and peasant masses and the bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie and those between the peoples of various nationalities and the ruling clique of Soviet social imperialism. The bureaucratic and monopolist bourgeoisie mortally fear and resent the Soviet workers and other laboring people. At the 24th CPSU Congress Brezhnev repeatedly stressed a "strengthening of the judicial system." In a television talk Podgorny likewise asserted that strict observance of laws shou...

be the "primary obligation" of one and all. On the other hand, newspapers and periodicals called for the need to "step up law enforcement work by the courts, procuratorates, arbitration departments, notarial organizations, the police and other administrative organs." What they were after was "absolute observance" by everybody of the capitalist order of exploitation. This they tried to achieve by every possible means.

Fascist white terror pervades the Soviet Union today. Whoever is disgruntled about the exploitation and oppression carried out by the Soviet revisionist ruling clique and dares to struggle against it will be watched, followed, interrogated or sent to the "mental asylum." The offenders will be arrested and banished on charges of "defaming the Soviet state and social order." Concentration camps, labor reform camps, prisons and "sanatoriums for lunatics" have been set up throughout the Soviet Union. In thousands of concentration camps in that country tens of thousands of political prisoners are kept. Many others far in excess of these figures have been taken into custody or detained in various forms.

However, bloody rule and ruthless suppression have not been effective in arresting the Soviet people's awakening and mounting resistance. As far back as 1962 there was struggle in Novocherkask (诺沃切尔卡斯克) city against raising the prices of meat and butter. In 1963 the dockers in Odessa went on strike to protest against the rising food prices. The struggle of the inhabitants of Erivan in 1965 was followed by demonstrations and parades in 1968 by the Tartars in Cherck (奇尔奇克), Crimea. The 1968-69 strikes by the rubber products workers in Sverdlovsk and the miners' struggle for bread which occurred in a townlet in the vicinity of Vladivostok in 1968 were preceded by massive rioting in Chimkent city in 1967. Mass struggles went a step further in the 1970's. For instance, struggling people numbering nearly ten thousand were reported in Dneprodzerzhinsk on June 25, 1972. Elsewhere in Leningrad and Moscow strikes occurred from time to time.

Under the guise of "keeping in close contact" with and "accommodating" the various nationalities, the Khrushchev-Brezhnev renegade clique has carried out a policy of imperialist and colonialist plunder among the minority groups inhabiting the Soviet territory. This has forced the regions inhabited by the minority groups to seek unitary economic development and turn these regions into supply bases for raw materials and farm products. This brutal oppression of the nationalities and colonialist plunder has aroused the strong resistance on the part of the peoples of various nationalities. "Struggle among the nationalities in the last analysis is a question of class struggle." (Chairman Mao, "Statement in Support of the Just Struggle of the American Negroes against US Imperialist Racial Discrimination") Spurred by the class struggle of the Soviet workers, the people of various national minorities have likewise risen to struggle against the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. Despite the imprisonment of many people or confinement in hard labor camps on charges of "nationalism," the struggles of the peoples of national minorities against the oppression and enslavement imposed by Soviet social imperialism have not subsided.

Great leader Chairman Mao has pointed out: "The Soviet Union is the first socialist state and the Soviet Communist Party was founded by Lenin. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Soviet Party and state has now been usurped by the revisionists. However, I would advise the comrades to firmly believe that the vast numbers of the Soviet people, Party members and cadres are good and want revolution and that the revisionist rule will not last long." With the awakening of the peoples of various nationalities in the Soviet Union, the mass struggle carried out by the Soviet people against the Soviet revisionist renegade clique is developing. Since the socialist system replacing the capitalist system is an objective law independent of man's will, the Soviet people will eventually overthrow the revisionist rule and become the masters of their own country.

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Historical Truth Cannot Be Distorted

- Some problems concerning the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipuchu"

by

Chung O (钟锷)

(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/, No. 2, April 20, 1975)

The "Treaty of Nipuchu" /Nerchinsk/ signed on September 7, 1689 was the first treaty relating to boundaries officially concluded between China and Russia. It clearly defined the eastern section of the Sino-Russian boundary and legally affirmed that the valleys of the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers south of the Outer Khingan Mountains are Chinese territory. By this treaty China recovered Yaksa and other territories invaded and occupied by Tsarist Russia, stopped its armed invasions against Heilungkiang for dozens of years, and maintained peace and serenity in China's northeastern border regions for a relatively long period. Russia agreed to withdraw its invading troops from the Heilung River area. At the same time, Tzarist Russia by the "treaty" incorporated into its territory the areas of Nipuchu /Nerchinsk/ east of Lake Baikal ceded by China and also obtained important trade concessions. The "treaty" also provided that the valleys of the Wuti /Uda/ River originally belonging to China should be designated as an area under negotiations. As clearly indicated by the negotiations for the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipuchu" and by all the articles contained therein, the treaty was the result of negotiations between the two parties on an equal basis in which China made important concessions.

There originally were no differences of opinion in principle between China and the Soviet Union in the assessment of the "Treaty of Nipuchu." Many works published in the Soviet Union in the past manifestly acknowledged that "from the viewpoint of international law, the 'Treaty of Nipuchu' of 1689 was the first treaty concluded between Russia and China on the basis of equality and mutual benefit";* stressed that it was "a treaty favorable to Russia";** and pointed out that "the conclusion of the 'Treaty of Nipuchu' essentially represented an extremely important and

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* Shepinkov (谢宾科夫), "Russo-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century," 1960 Moscow edition, p. 208.

** Saskina (沙斯京娜), "Russo-Mongolian Diplomatic Relations in the 17th Century," 1958 Moscow Edition, p. 151. Kafengus' (卡芬格乌斯) book, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Age of Peter I," also pointed out: "The 'Nipuchu Treaty' was 'advantageous to Russia.'" See this book's 1942 Moscow edition, p. 5.

great victory for Muscovite diplomacy."* Even the "Dictionary of Foreign Affairs" compiled in 1961 by people like Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stresses that the negotiations on the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nipuchu "were official negotiations conducted on an equal basis" and that "the treaty consolidated and expanded the harmonious relations between the peoples of two neighboring countries."** These assertions in general are in keeping with historical facts.

Now, to meet the demands of the aggressive and expansionist policies of social-imperialism, the Soviet revisionists have eaten their own words, violently attacked and distorted the "Treaty of Nipuchu," and completely negated its legal validity, babbling that prior to signing the "Treaty of Nipuchu" China had waged a war of plunder against Russia and that the treaty was one Russia was forced to sign at the cost of ceding territory.*** The vicious motives behind the Soviet revisionists' distorting the "Treaty of Nipuchu" are obvious: they want to term such unequal treaties as the "Treaty of Aigun" and the "Treaty of Peking" which Tzarist Russia forcibly imposed on China after the Opium War as equal ones, and to describe the vast tract of Chinese territory down the valleys of the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers annexed by Tsarist Russia pursuant to these unequal treaties as land "partially recovered" from "territories seized from Russia" by the Ch'ing Dynasty through the "Treaty of Nipuchu," so as to create public opinion on which the Soviet revisionists can base their territorial claims to China. If the "Treaty of Nipuchu" were really as the Soviet revisionists describe, an important issue would then arise: who was the aggressor prior to the signing of the "treaty"? And what is the real essence of this "treaty"? We must provide answers to these questions in order to restore historical facts and unveil the ugly features of the Soviet revisionists in fabricating history and turning themselves into apologists for colonialism.

I. Did China Invade Tsarist Russia or Did Tsarist Russia Invade China?

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* "Diplomatic History" edited by Bochomkin (鲍哥姆金), Vol. I, 1941 Moscow edition, p. 231.

** "Diplomatic Dictionary," Vol. II, 1961 Moscow edition, pp. 403-404.

*** Malikov, "Manchurians in the Northeast (17th Century)," 1974 Moscow edition; Malikov, "Expansion of the Ch'ing Dynasty of China into the Heilung River Basin and Central Asia 17th-18th Centuries," published in the Soviet journal "Historical Problems," No. 7, 1974; "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations" edited by Tikhvinskiy, Vol. II, 1972 Moscow edition; "China's Modern History" edited by Tikhvinskiy, 1972 Moscow edition; Narochinisky(纳罗奇尼茨基), Slatkovskiy (斯拉德科夫斯基) and others, "International Relations in the Far East," 1973 Moscow edition; Pisklovni (别斯克罗夫内), Tikhvinskiy and Khrostov, "On the History of Formation of Russo-Chinese Boundaries," published in the Soviet magazine "International Life," No. 6, 1972; and so forth.

One of the important tricks used by the Soviet revisionists in distorting the "Treaty of Nipuchu" is to falsify the historical background prior to the signing of the "treaty." They describe the valleys of the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers as "Russian territories since ancient times" and as "new land" "reclaimed" by the Russians, while smearing the struggle waged by the Chinese army and people against Tsarist Russian invasions as "wars of plunder and acts of aggression." This completely confuses black and white.

As clearly indicated by historical facts, the valleys of the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers are soil where the Chinese people have labored, grown up and procreated since ancient times. No later than the first half of the 8th century, some 700 years before the Russians consolidated themselves into a unified nation, the Chinese government of the T'ang Dynasty had already set up administrative organs in the valleys of the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers. Later the Liao, Chin, Yuan and Ming dynasties of China continuously set up official organs there to govern the people and exercise effective jurisdiction.

At the end of the 16th century, Nurhachi, a local official of the Nuchen nationality of the Ming Dynasty, rose in the Northeast and gradually placed the northeastern territories of the Ming Dynasty under his personal rule. He achieved successively unification of the Chienchou and Haihsi Nuchens and began to seek the unification of the valleys of the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers. Through the two eras of Nurhachi and his successor Huangtaichi and up to the end of the third decade of the 17th century, the vast areas from Lake Baikal in the west to the Outer Khingan Mountains in the north, the Sea of Japan in the south and the Sea of Okhotsk including Sakhalin in the east, were all incorporated into the territory of the Ch'ing Dynasty. The subjects of the Ming reign, scattered over these regions including the Mongol, Owenk, Tahur, Olunchun, Chiler, Hoche, Feiyako and Chiakala, all became subjects of the Ch'ing Dynasty, which assigned officials there to exercise jurisdiction and collect taxes. Some of them were directly incorporated into the Eight Banners and were ruled by such officials as the Niuluchangchings (牛录章京). For example, names of large numbers of Niuluchangchings of Solun nationality (including the Owenk, Tahur and Olunchun) were recorded in the "True Record" of Huangtaichi Emperor T'ai Tsung of the Ch'ing Dynasty. Many noted families in the Eight Banners lived in these regions. For example, the Yencha family resided along the Wusuli and Yalan Rivers; the Kuocho family resided in the valley of the Ahkuli River (presently the Waku River in the Soviet Union) east of Wusuli; the Wuchala family resided along the Hungchiali River on the lower reaches of the Heilung River; the Chingchili and Kuopeile families resided along the Chingchili River (presently the Zeya River in the Soviet Union); and the Ocho family resided along Yaksa. The places along Nipuchu and the Onon River were part of the nomadic areas of the Maommgan tribe of China's Mongolian nationality.

During this period, the Russians had not even had the opportunity to see what the Heilung River looked like. However, the Soviet revisionists claimed unabashedly that the area of the Heilung River has been Russian territory "since ancient times" and that "before the appearance of the

Russians, the Heilung River area and the Wusuli River border regions not only "did not belong to China" but even the Chinese government was "completely ignorant of these places at that time." This is curious talk indeed! They are out-and-out subjective idealists, believing that history can be fabricated at will. However, the facts are clear enough. Before the invasion of the first group of Tsarist Russian Cossack bandits into Heilungkiang in 1643, the area had been ruled by the governments of Chinese dynasties for nearly a thousand years. This ironclad historical fact can in no way be altered by any lie or artifice. Even Tsarist Russian scholars confirmed that the Ming Dynasty "set up local administrative organs and changed Nurkan into a provincial-level office" at Terin in the lower reaches of the Heilung River.* The Tahur (达斡尔) area eas of Lake Baikal and north of the Heilung River was "the northernmost region of China."** "In writing the complete history of Amur Province, we should write the history of the time when it was a part of the northern territory of Manchuria."*** Nicolai (尼果赖), an envoy Russia sent to China in 1676 also admitted: The people of Tahur and Choucher (Nuchen) residing in the areas of the Chingchili, Niuman, Sungari and Wusuli Rivers were Chinese subjects.+ Even Nevelskoy, the pioneer of Tsarist Russian aggression against China, had to admit that the area of the Heilung River was "the land belonging to China as publicly acknowledged by our (Russian) government and by all the civilized world at that time."++ Closing their ears when stealing a bell, the Soviet revisionists are telling lies today to deceive others as well as themselves.

As is known to all, the Russians formed a unified nation only late in the 15th or early in the 16th century. Russian territory west of the Ural Mountains was very remote from China at that time. In 1581, Tsarist Russia began to cross the Ural mountains to expand eastward, occupying large tracts of land in Siberia, and was not a neighboring country of China until the 17th century.

Engels pointed out: Tsarist Russia's outward expansion was carried out "one conquest after another and one annexation after another." ("The

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* Vasilyev, "On the Records in the Tablets on the Steep Cliff Near the Mouth of the Heilung River," published in "Bulletins of Russian Academy of Sciences," No. 4, April 1896.

** "Encyclopedia," 1835 Petersburg edition, Vol. II, p. 161.

*** "Accounts of the Amur Province," edited by Gromo-Kerimaylo (格鲁姆·格尔日麦洛) 1894 Petersburg edition, p. 6.

\+ "Russia, Mongolia and China," edited by Pateley (巴德雷), Vol. II, 1919 London edition, pp. 238-240.

++ Nevelskoy, "The Merits of Russian Naval Officers in the Russian Far East," 1947 Moscow edition, p. 363.

Bone of Contention in Turkey") Tsarist Russia's intrusion into China's areas east of Lake Baikal and the valley of the Heilung River was precisely a continuation of its conquest of Siberia. At that time, Russia had already started a primitive process of capital accumulation. Its aggression and expansion were marked not only by traditional feudal territorial conquests but also by all the features of colonial plunder in a primitive process of accumulation, with its brutality, barbarity and avarice equalling, if not surpassing the outrages of colonial plunder committed by the Western colonialists in America, Africa and Indonesia in the same period.

In 1643, taking advantage of the situation in which the main force of the Ch'ing army was entering Shanhaikuan with the Ming Dynasty being superseded by the Ch'ing Dynasty, the Tsarist government for the first time sent its armed bandits led by Poyarkov to intrude into the valley of China's Heilung River. In 1644 the Tzar instructed Yakutsk to lead a detachment of military personnel to places along China's Chingchili River to "carry out reconnaissance and conquer these areas," stating: "If there are people on the new land who prove to be difficult to handle.... these people should be made to submit by war and such means as destroying some of their areas."* Directly instigated and encouraged by the Tsarist government, Khabarov, Schepanov (斯捷潘诺夫) and others led groups of Cossack bandits, taking Yakutsk as a base, to cross the Outer Khingan Mountains and intrude into areas of the Heilung River one after another. They were bluntly told by the local inhabitants: The people of the valley of the Heilung River were "subjects of the Chinese Emperor" and "paid taxes to Chinese Emperor Shunchih."** But these colonialist bandits bent on invading and occupying Chinese territory ignored these words. They seized and occupied Yaksa, an area where Arpahsi (阿尔巴西), headman of the Chinese Tahur nationality, lived, forcibly built fortresses there, and renamed Yaksa Albazin. Khabarov even asked Frantsbekov, commander of the Russian forces at Yakustk, to send troops to "subjugate Samusakan" (referring to Emperor Shunchih--Author)." Then Frantsbekov immediately requested in a memorial to the Tsar that a big army be sent to "occupy the Tahur area (referring to an area along the upper and middle reaches of the Heilung River east of Lake Baikal) and to bring Samusakan under control."+ Subsequently, a force under the command of Kichikin (契奇金) was dispatched to support Khabarov, who was instructed to send a message to Shunchih ordering him "to submit to Russia." The letter stated that if he should not "submit to Russia," the Tsar would "use military force to take over your cities and kill you and all the princes, including women and children." At the same time, Shunchih was asked to immediately "offer in tribute as much gold, silver, colorful cloth, diamonds, fur and leather as possible."++ Look, how inordinately arrogant and unbridled the Tsarist Russian aggressors were!

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* "Historical Data of Russia," edited by Funatskiy (佛纳德斯基), Vol. I, 1972 US Yale University edition, p. 268.

** Vasilyev, "Cossacks Beyond the Baikal," Vol. I, 1916 Chita edition, p. 72.

\+ Ibid., pp. 69-70.

++ "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations," edited by Tikhvinskiy, Vol. I, 1969 Moscow edition, pp. 132-134.

While Poyarkov and Khabarov were invading the valley of the Heilung River in the south, the Tsarist Russian colonialist authorities in Yeniseisk ceaselessly sent "expeditionary forces" to carry out aggression toward the east across Lake Baikal, forcibly building fortresses in Nipuchu, which was populated by the Maomingan tribe of China's Mongol nationality. Nipuchu was renamed Nerchinsk and used as a base to move further forward into the middle and lower reaches of the Heilung River.

After their intrusion into Chinese territory, these bestial Tsarist Russian colonialist bandits robbed the inhabitants everywhere of all domestic animals, grain, fur and leather. They brutally tortured the "hostages" they kidnapped and extorted everything they could from them. If the "hostages" failed to satisfy their demands, they "would be chopped into two." They kidnapped women and children and wilfully tormented them. Women who refused to submit "were choked to death at night."* They turned their guns on cities and villages, carrying out massacres, burning groups of Chinese hunters alive in houses.** Wherever they went, blood was shed. Devastated by these aggressive bandits, the beautiful territory along the Heilung River suddenly became desolate, and many Chinese residents there were drowned in a bloodbath.

Even some Tsarist Russian scholars did not deny the atrocities of the Cossack bandits. For example, Davydov (达维多夫) pointed out: "The complete reference materials relating to the above-mentioned period (the mid-17th century--Author) which we have in hand shows a horrible picture of the inhuman attitude of the early Russians from foreign lands toward the various tribes in the Heilung River area."+ Early Soviet scholars had severely denounced the criminal acts of the Cossacks and denounced Khabarov as "the 17th century Russian aggressor."++ Both historical records and public opinion have long since nailed the colonialist gangsters worshipped by the Soviet revisionist on the pillory of history.

The Soviet revisionists have falsely accused the self-defense actions of the Ch'ing troops against Tsarist Russian aggression as "a war of plunder and an act of aggression." This is an old trick of the thief crying "Catch the thief."

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* Bakluzin (巴赫鲁申), "The Cossacks of the Heilung River," 1925 Leningrad edition, pp. 28, 30, 50.

** "Factual Records of K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty," Vol. 112, pp. 5-6; Kolupsov (戈鲁布佐夫), "History of Ancient Albazin," 1902 Blagoveschensk edition, p. 14.

\+ Davydov, "Colonization in Manchuria and Northeastern Mongolia," 1911 Vladivostok edition, p. 11.

++ "Encyclopedia of the Soviet Union," Vol. 59, 1935 Moscow edition, p. 372.

Lenin said: "How can we discover the 'real essence' of war? How can we recognize it? War is the continuation of policy. We should study the policies before war and study the policies which are leading to or have already led to war." ("Caricature of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economism'")

The war between China and Russia before the "Treaty of Nipuchu" was signed was imposed on China by Tsarist Russia. The intrusion into the Heilung River valley, trampling on China's sovereignty, trampling the Chinese people underfoot under the policy of barbarous aggression and expansion pursued by Tsarist Russia were the root causes leading to war. Where there is oppression, there is resistance; where there is aggression, there is struggle against aggression. For the Chinese army and people to counter-attack the invader and to safeguard territorial integrity and national independence is a right of self-defense enjoyed by every country. The battle of Wuchala (乌札拉) village waged by the Ch'ing troops against the Khabarov bandit gang in 1652, the Humar (呼玛尔) battle to encircle the Tzarist Russian invaders in 1655, the Sungaria battle that wiped out the Schepanov bandit gang in 1658, and the two Yaksa battles in 1685 and 1686 were all just wars carried out by the Chinese people on their own territory to counter-attack Tsarist Russian aggression. The early Soviet historian Pakluzin (巴赫鲁申) pointed out: "While invading the peaceful Tahur area, Russia carried out brutal massacres and pillaged everything on this area of land, ...the Chinese emperor--the supreme monarch of the Tahur area--was their sole and natural protector."* He exposed the essence of Tsarist Russian aggression and fully affirmed the just resistance by the Ch'ing troops against aggression. This is a loud slap in the face to the Soviet revisionists, who are keen in defending Tzarist Russia's colonial expansionist policies.

II. The "Treaty of Nipuchu" Was Negotiated on the Basis of Equality and Concluded with Solemnity

Another major trick of the Soviet revisionists in negating the "Treaty of Nipuchu" is their obstinate assertion that China "violated all principles and practices of international law," "presented its claims on the basis of fabricated reasons," and "imposed on Russia" territorial clauses by "using military threat"; and that the "Treaty of Nipuchu" was an "unequal treaty" to Russia, "which meant the loss of large tracts of land for Russia," and so on and so forth.

The history of early Tsarist Russian aggression against China itself proves the absurdity of the Soviet revisionists' assertions. We have pointed out that before the signing of the "Treaty of Nipuchu," Tzarist Russia had already carried out its aggression against China for several decades. The repeated appeals of the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty to Tsarist Russia to cease its armed aggression and to seek peaceful solutions to the border problems between the two countries were all rejected, and it was finally forced to carry out counter-attacks

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* Pakluzin, Op. Cit., pp. 41-42.

in self-defense. In 1686, after suffering setbacks in its armed aggression, Tsarist Russia expressed its acceptance of the peace proposals presented by the Ch'ing government. At that time, although the Chinese armed forces were winning victory after victory at Yaksa and could have taken the beleagued city at any time, the Ch'ing government, upon learning of Russia's agreement to hold peace talks, immediately ordered an unconditional end to the siege of Yaksa and withdrawal of all forces to Aigun and other places. This action created favorable conditions for Sino-Russian talks. Today, the Soviet revisionists have outrageously portrayed the inherently aggressive Tsarist Russia as the oppressed party and described China, the country which was invaded, as the aggressor and oppressor, ignoring the consistent efforts of the Chinese side to make peace. This is truly a great feat in confusing black with white and right with wrong!

The Soviet revisionists arbitrarily asserted that the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty presented "territorial demands" to Tsarist Russia. This is utter nonsense. The vast region east of Lake Baikal and south of the Outer Khingan Range and leading to the Sea of Okhotsk has been Chinese territory since ancient times. One year before the Nipuchu talks between China and Russia began, K'ang-hsi had clearly pointed out that the conflict between China and Russia was created by Tsarist Russia's aggression against China. He said: "The Russians invaded our border region, fought with us on the Heilung, Sungari, and Humar Rivers, occupied Nipuchao (尼布潮) and Yaksa areas under our jurisdiction, and gave asylum to Ghantimur and other deserters from our side. Then our troops secured positions on the Heilung River, twice attacked Yaksa and laid siege to the city. These are the reasons for our dealings with the Russians." He also instructed his government delegation, saying: "All the upper reaches and lower reaches of Heilung River, and every single tributary and stream of this river are our territory, and should not at all be given up to Russia.... If Russia acts in compliance with my edict, its deserters and its people whom our great troops captured or who defected to our side will be returned to it; a demarcation line will be drawn with it; and it will be allowed to send an envoy to us and to trade with us."* He expressed his determination to recover Chinese territory occupied by Tzarist Russia through aggression and draw the demarcation line and make peace between the two sides on an equal basis. Didn't an independent country have the right to safeguard its own sovereignty and territorial integrity? Could it be that doing this should be interpreted as submitting "territorial claims" to Tzarist Russia? In June 1689, in view of the collaboration between Galdan, the leader of the Dzungarian rebels, and Tsarist Russia in the invasion of Khalkha Mongolia, and in order to prevent them from further colluding with each other and defend the northern borders, K'ang-hsi hoped that an early agreement could be reached with Tsarist Russia. Therefore, he again instructed the departing delegation of the Ch'ing Dynasty, saying: When you begin the talks, you should still adhere to my previous instructions, and "if the representatives of the other side earnestly demand

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* "Factual Records of K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty," Vol. 135, p. 15.

Nipuchao, you may take the Argun (River) as the boundary."* This imperial edict took the initiative to offer to cede places along Nipuchu, which originally belonged to China, to Tsarist Russia, in preparation for a major territorial concession. It was in fact the guiding principle for the Ch'ing delegation in the Nipuchu talks. Could it also be interpreted as making "territorial claims" to Tsarist Russia?

Actually, it was the Tsarist Russian aggressors themselves who made the territorial claims "based on fabricated reasons." In early 1686, a secret order was issued to the departing envoy plenipotentiary Golovin by the Tsarist Russian government. The major points of the secret order read: (1) "The Heilung River should be taken as the boundary." (2) "If the military officials of the Chinese Emperor refuse to take the Heilung River as the boundary on the grounds that the Heilung River flows into the sea through the urban and rural areas of Chinese territory," then the Russian side "should at least propose to take the Bystraya River (also called Bureya River, that is, the Niuman River--Author) which flows into the Heilung River or the Heilung River on the upper reaches of the Zeya River as the boundary." (3) "Should the Chinese stand firm on their original proposals and refuse to make any concessions and sign a peace agreement in accordance with the treaty mentioned above, then the envoy must act on the order of His Majesty the Tsar and the military instructions of the Siberia Ministry to take action accordingly (military operations)."** One may ask if such instructions were not aimed at forcing the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty to accept the arrogant and unreasonable territorial demands of the Russian side, then what were they?

Subsequently, confronted with the unstable political situation arising from the defeat of its expedition in the Crimea, the Tsarist Russian government had revised the plan for negotiations with China on several occasions, lowering some of its demands. However, no matter how the plan was revised, the starting point remained unchanged, that is, to try to take over all or parts of the Chinese territory north of the Heilung River through diplomatic negotiations, and to try in every possible way to maintain what it had gained from aggression.

Negotiations for the Treaty of Nipuchu officially began on August 22, 1689. Golovin was the first to speak at the meeting, falsely accusing China of provoking the war and demanding that the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty accept the unreasonable demand that "the two countries should take the Heilung River to the sea as the boundary." This unreasonable demand was refuted on the spot by Suotu (索额图), envoy of the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty, who solemnly pointed out: Because of the Russian intrusion into Yaksa and other places of China, which created a

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* "Factual Records of K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty," Vol. 140, p. 30.

** Karen (加恩), "History of Russo-Chinese Relations in the Age of Peter the Great (1689-1730)," 1912 Paris edition, "Appendices," p. 3.

serious threat to the local Chinese residents, China had no choice but to strike back in self-defense. He also pointed out: "Onon and Nipuchao used to be the nomadic areas of the Maomingan and other tribes under Chinese jurisdiction while Yaksa was the former residential area of Arpahsi (阿尔巴西), a Chinese official in charge of mountains and hunting, and others and was later seized by the Russians."* The Tsarist Russian aggressors should have pulled back to west of elenga and returned the area of Nipuchu and Yaksa to China because these areas were the land of China's Mongol nationality and had always belonged to China.** Powerless to defend his position, Golovin brusquely declared that "there is no time to discuss historical facts!"+

The Russian side proceeded according to their fixed policy at the second meeting. They first stood firm on their original proposal, and demanded "taking the Heilung River as the boundary," saying that the river "had long belonged to the Tsar."++ They then decided to make a "concession." They proposed to allot the large areas west of the Bureya or Zeya Rivers and north of the Heilung River to Russia, and demanded that China must compensate Russia for her "loss" of Yaksa and other places. Being desirous of signing a treaty and delineating the boundary as soon as possible, Suoto on the one hand made it positively clear that he could not accept the Russian proposal, and, on the other, took the initiative to make a concession by declaring that Nipuchu could be transferred to Russia. But this important territorial concession by the Chinese side still failed to satisfy the Russian, and their total rejection of it brought the negotiations to a deadlock.

Due to the fact that the Russian side obstinately clung to its stand, the Sino-Russian meeting had to be suspended on August 24. The delegation of the Ch'ing Dynasty was very much concerned and worried that "the Muscovites would not want peace, and all they have been doing is marking time with ulterior motives."+++ To save the negotiations, the delegation of the Ch'ing Dynasty notified the Russian side that if it had matters for discussion, the Chinese side would still be prepared to listen to its views and reply. At the same time, in view of Russia's threat to suspend the negotiations, the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty strengthened its preparedness and vigilance against war.

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* "Factual Records of K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty," Vol. 143, p. 14.

** Hald (荷尔德), "Notes on China," Vol. II, 1738-1741 London edition, p. 311.

\+ Liu Hsüan-min (刘选民), "Sino-Russian Relations Before the Nipuchu Treaty," published in "Gazette of Chinese Social and Political Studies," No. 23 (1940).

++ Yakovleva (雅科夫列娃), "The First Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1689," 1958 Moscow edition, p. 167.

+++ Serbes, "The Jesuits and the Nipuchu Treaty between China and Russia," 1961 Rome edition, p. 239.

After August 25, the two sides resumed their talks through interpreters. After justifiably refuting the Russian side's unreasonable demands, the Chinese side time and again expressed its hope for mutual concessions. At that time, the raging anti-Russian struggle by the people of the Buryat and other nationalities in Nipuchu and nearby areas had thrown Golovin into panic, for he feared that the further development of this situation would not only have a bearing on the issues of Nipuchu and Yaksa, but might force Tsarist Russia to return all the lands east of Lake Baikal to China. Meanwhile, the Russians discovered that there was very little inhabitable land between Yaksa and the Gorbitsa River, where sable skins were not available. And they discovered silver deposits and salt water lakes on the western bank of the Argun River, where there was much arable land.* Thus the Russian side no longer insisted on occupying areas on the northern bank of the Heilung River, including Yaksa. Compared with the demand of the Tzarist government that "the Heilung River be the boundary between the two countries," the price was indeed lowered, but it "does not go beyond the instructions /of the Tsar/."** Through protracted negotiations, the two sides finally agreed that the boundary between the two countries went along the Argun and Gorbitsa Rivers and the Outer Khingan Mountains stretching to the sea. On September 6, the two sides reached an overall agreement on the basis of the draft of the treaty submitted by the Russian side.

The above facts eloquently prove that the "Nipuchu Treaty" was the result of consultation on an equal footing and of major concessions made by the Chinese side. Therefore, it is completely groundless for the Soviet revisionists to allege that China "imposed heavy territorial claims on the Russian side." What they term the Russian side "lost large tracts of land" is just a distortion of history. The "Nipuchu Treaty" only shows that Tsarist Russia recognized the fact that the areas along the Heilung and Wusuli Rivers had belonged to China since ancient times, and the treaty provided that part of the lands forcibly occupied by T arist Russia be returned to China. Soviet scholars in the early period also held that the "Nipuchu Treaty" made Russia "give up the lands it had forcibly occupied along the Heilung River."+ After the signing of the "Nipuchu Treaty," "Russia lost" most of the lands "it had occupied by doing damage to China during the preceding half a century."++ It was

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* "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations," Vol. II, 1972 Moscow edition, pp. 544-545.

** Trusevich (特鲁塞维奇), "Russo-Chinese Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," 1882 Moscow edition, p. 32.

\+ Kharensky (哈恩斯基), "China, Ancient and Modern" 1927 Khabarovsk-Vladivostok edition, p. 269.

++ Anderson, "Unequal Treaties Concluded between Tsarist Russia and China in 19th Century," published in Soviet magazine "Class Struggle," No. 9, 1936.

completely in conformity with such basic principles of international law as mutual respect for sovereignty and equality that China recovered its own territory forcibly occupied by Tsarist Russia. But the Soviet revisionists describe this just event as China "annexing" Tsarist Russian territory and Russia "suffering losses." Isn't this absurd to the extreme?

Soviet revisionists also allege that by having troops accompany the delegation to Nipuchu, the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty was exerting military pressure on the Russian side, and lacking in good faith toward peace. This is an even greater distortion of the truth.

As mentioned above, it was the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty, not Tsarist Russia, that first proposed seeking a peaceful solution to the border dispute between the two countries. It was Tsarist Russia, not China, that lacked good faith in peace and attempted to exercise military pressure on China in the course of the negotiations. The Golovin delegation was not a dove with an olive branch in its beak, but a double-headed hawk armed to the teeth. The Tsar authorized Golovin to recruit soldiers in Siberia to support the Tsarist Russian aggressor forces in areas along the Heilung River and to "try by every means" to "rebuild" the colonial strongholds on China's territory that had been destroyed by the Ch'ing troops.* The news that a large number of Russian troops were driving into the Heilung River region with Golovin "caused serious unrest in China."** In a note to the Ch'ing government Tsarist Russia claimed that the Tsar had "dispatched numerous strong troops" to Yaksa to "quell the enemies."*** Such threats gave the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty no choice but to be vigilant. With Tsarist Russia already reinforcing its military strength in the Heilung River region, it was completely necessary for the government of the Ch'ing Dynasty to send out a certain number of troops there. Without this reinforcement, it would have been impossible to safeguard the safety of the Ch'ing delegation and free it from Russian military threat, let alone having the talks conducted normally on the basis of equality. It should be pointed out more emphatically that Nipuchu at that time was a fortified city where heavy troops were placed by Tsarist Russia for aggressive purposes. It was Tsarist Russia, not China, which had placed cannon in the city, and the talks were actually conducted in full view of Tsarist Russia's cannon. That K'ang-hsi agreed to hold talks in such a place fully expressed the sincerity of the Chinese side in seeking peace. In the face of these iron-clad facts, isn't it clear who was attempting to resort to military threat during the negotiations?

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* Yakovleva, op. cit., pp. 129-131.

** Ibid., p. 153.

*** Bantis-Kaminskiy (班迪什-卡敏斯基), "A Collection of Documents on Diplomatic Relations between Russia and China, 1619 to 1792," 1892 Kazan edition, p. 41.

The Soviet revisionists have made all sorts of efforts to exaggerate the number of the Ch'ing troops accompanying the delegation and their weapons and equipment. They even counted the boatsmen, dependents of the Ch'ing envoys and coolies as members of the fighting units in an attempt to create a false impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of a "huge and superior Manchu armed force," in order to prove their allegations. They have talked so much nonsense that they have only contradicted themselves.* In fact, according to historical documents, only 800 troops escorted the 1688 Ch'ing delegation on its way to Selenginsk.** Half way there, the delegation was stopped by Galdan's rebels and forced to turn back. The next year, the delegation took another route to Nipuchu. Learning that Golovin had come with a large army, the Ch'ing delegation discreetly increased its military escort force. Some 1,500 troops were sent by waterways from Heilungkiang*** while 1,400 accompanied the delegation and travelled overland,+ bringing the total number of Chinese troops at Nipuchu to some 2,900. As for the Tsarist Russian side, when Golovin set out from Moscow in 1686, he had 500 musketeers accompanying him; when we travelled through Siberia, he recruited 1,400 Cossak soldiers there, thus increasing his strength to about 2,000.++ Adding the Tsarist Russian troops already stationed in the Nipuchu and Yaksa areas, Golovin had "a total strength of between 2,500 and 3,000."+++ In other words, both sides had about the same troop strength

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* There are various strange claims concerning the number of troops accompanying the Ch'ing delegation: "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations" put the number at 6,000 (Foreword to Vol. II, pp. 19-20); Tikhvinskiy and others puts the number at 8,000 (China's Modern History," p. 59); Liyapova (利亚波娃) puts the number at 10,000 ("Outline History of Far Eastern Russia," 1958 Khabarovsk edition, p. 51); Nelochinisky (纳罗奇尼茨基) and Yakovleva (雅科夫列娃) put the number of combined land and naval troops at between 15,000 to 17,000, of which 3,000 were naval troops ("International Relations in the Far East," p. 30; and "The First Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1689," pp. 157, 158, 175); Kapanov (卡巴诺夫) exaggerates that the naval troops alone numbered 10,000 ("The Question of the Heilung River," 1959 Blagoveschensk edition, pp. 20-21); Chiapitsai (贾玉才) states that the Ch'ing government "amassed some 17,500 crack troops near Nipuchu" ("Documents That Uncover the Truth"); etc.

** "Factual Records of K'ang-hsi of the Ch'ing Dynasty," Vol. 134, p. 3.

*** Ibid., Vol. 140, p. 30; and Hald, op.cit. p. 308.

\+ Hald, op. cit., p. 308; according to Golovin's report, only 1,000 Ch'ing troops took the land route, see "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations," Vol. II, p. 483.

++ Bantis-Karminskiy, op. cit., p. 52; Vasilyev, op. cit., Volume I, p. 158, Footnote 1. Trusevich states Golovin led a total of 2,400 troops, see "Russo-Chinese Diplomatic and Commercial Relations," p. 30.

+++ Yakovleva, op. cit., p. 144.

in the Nipuchu area. As far as weapons were concerned, the Ch'ing army was far inferior to the Russian army. Some Soviet writers have frankly admitted: "The Russian envoys won a diplomatic victory at Nipuchu.... This victory was decided by the confidence of the Russian people in the strong might of Russia and their knowledge of the fact that China was militarily more backward. The Ch'ing troops mostly used bows and arrows as their weapons while the Russians had long reliably possessed firearms."* This shows that neither the troop strength nor the condition of weapons and equipment could support the allegation that the Chinese side used superior armed force to carry out threats and undermine the basis of equality of the negotiations.

The equal size of security guards of the Chinese and Russian sides at the Nipuchu conference also showed the groundless allegation that "China forced Russia to sign the treaty by force of arms." On the eve of the negotiations, the Chinese and Russian sides had consulted each other thoroughly on the numbers of guards to be responsible for security at the conference site. While accepting the Russian proposal that each side could bring 300 guards to the conference, the Chinese side proposed that with the exception of swords, no firearms of any kind should be allowed to be brought into the conference. During the talks, Ch'ing delegation strictly observed the above agreements, but the Russian side secretly ordered its security guards to attend the conference with concealed firearms--the highly lethal hand grenades.** Wasn't it the Russian delegation which attempted to carry out "armed threats" and create "an abnormal situation" during the talks?

It must be pointed out that the form of negotiations conducted at Nipuchu and the conclusion of the treaty (talks, meetings, signing, exchange of instruments and the oath-taking ceremony) were agreed upon by both sides after serious consultations. For example, prior to the formal opening of the negotiations, both sides, while consulting on conference procedures, had agreed that the envoys of the two countries "should take an equal stand in dealing with every issue," and that "under no circumstances should each place himself above the other."*** For another example, on the eve of the signing of the treaty, while both sides were consulting on signing procedures and the oath-taking ceremony, the Chinese side had proposed that the envoys of the two countries should put their seals , not their signatures, on the documents and that an exchange of documents would not be necessary. But the Russian side insisted that the treaty documents must be signed, sealed and exchanged by both sides, arguing that this was the only way to insure the legal validity of the treaty. At the same time, the Russian side stressed that the envoys of

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* Ibid., p. 189.

** "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations," Vol II, p. 505.

*** Hald, op. cit., p. 310.

the two countries must indicate in their own oaths the responsibility and determination of their own monarchs to carry out the treaty. The Chinese side accepted all these ideas of the Russian side. If the "Treaty of Nipuchu" had really been "an unequal treaty" imposed on Tsarist Russia, then, why was Golovin so anxious to sign this treaty, and so worried that the "Treaty of Nipuchu" might become a useless document? Why did he hope for the effective implementation of the treaty?

The Russian delegation was very satisfied with the signing of the "Nipuchu Treaty." After exchange of texts of the treaty, Golovin and other members of the Russian delegation time and again drank toasts amid Russian music and warmly embraced members of the Ch'ing delegation, remonstrating with them to stay one more day. The following day, Golovin sent a courier to present gifts to the envoy of the Ch'ing Dynasty as "a token of the sincere friendship the envoys of the two countries have forged in the past few days."* The courier passed on Golovin's remarks: The gifts he presented were things he greatly cherished, but to thank the Chinese officials, no matter how valuable these things were, they were not valuable enough in such circumstances. The sable and leopard skins symbolized his warm feelings; the alarm clock signaled that the two envoys could still hear from each other even after parting; the telescope could enable one to look far into the distance; and the silver pots and cups which could be used to drink wine symbolized that after parting the two envoys would still think of each other. If the "Nipuchu Treaty" had been an "unequal treaty" Russia signed under the pressure of the Ch'ing army, why were Golovin and others so jubilant? When Golovin was returning to Moscow, the Tsar sent officials to welcome him back on the way, awarding him medals and congratulating him on his success. Upon his return to Moscow, he was made a noble. He was received and commended by Ivan V and Peter I. This also sufficed to prove that the Tsarist government was very much satisfied with the signing of the "Nipuchu Treaty." If the "Nipuchu Treaty" had made "Russia lose large tracts of territory," why was Golovin given such special treatment and honor?

III. The Content of the "Nipuchu Treaty" Brooks No Distortion

Another important tactic used by the Soviet revisionists in slandering the "Nipuchu Treaty" is to wantonly distort the provisions of the treaty. They allege that the provisions of the treaty concerning the boundary were "ambiguous," "failed to define the boundary between Russia and China" and "even failed to really solve the border problem along the Heilung River." Thus they declare that "as a legal document, this treaty was imperfect," and so forth. Under the pen of the Soviet revisionists, the solemnly signed "Nipuchu Treaty" became a sheet of waste paper with no legal validity whatsoever. This is exactly the same as the lies spread by old Tsars while invading China's territory south of the Outer Khingan Mountains.

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* "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations," Vol. II, p. 600.

As a matter of fact, the "Nipuchu Treaty" legally and explicitly provided for the alignment of the eastern section of the border between the two countries. It stipulated that "the Chorna (绰尔纳) River, which flows into the Heilung River and which the Tartars call the Gorbitsa River near the Ulunm (乌伦穆) River, is taken as the boundary line between the two countries. The Gorbitsa River originated in the Shih-tahsingan (石大兴安) Range which stretches to the sea. This range is also the boundary line between the two countries: all the lands south of the range and all the big and small rivers flowing into the Heilung River should be under China's jurisdiction; all the lands and rivers north of the range should be under Russia's jurisdiction. But the question of how to define the rivers and lands between the Khingan Mountains and the Wuti (Uda) River is yet to be settled. This question can only be settled after the envoys of the two countries return to their respective countries and make a detailed examination following which special representatives or correspondence will be used to settle it. Besides, the Argun River flowing into the Heilung River is also the boundary line between the two countries: all the lands south of the river belong to China, and all the lands north of the river belong to Russia." From this part of the treaty it can clearly be seen that the "Nipuchu Treaty" contains clear, explicit and absolutely unquestionable provisions on the delineation of the Sino-Russian boundary which extends from the Outer Khingan Mountains to the sea and follows the Gorbitsa River and the Argun River. The eastern section of the Sino-Russian boundary before 1858, which was drawn on the basis of the above provisions of the "Nipuchu Treaty," can also be found in maps published in Russia. These are the "Eastern Siberia Map" attached to the book "Count Muraveyev-Rarmozskiy" published in Russia in 1891, and the "Map of the Territorial Expansion of Russia in Asia" contained in the 1914 official Tsarist Russian edition of the "Atlas of the Asian Portion of Russia." Bakluzin (巴赫鲁申), a historian in the early days of the Soviet Union, explicitly pointed out that this treaty "stipulates the boundary runs along the Argun River, the Gorbitsa River and the Yablonovy and Stanovoy Range."* The book "Eastern Siberia" edited by the British historian Poloslo (普罗思罗) also explicitly points out that the allegation of the so-called "ambiguity" involving the "Nipuchu Treaty" is "groundless, because the treaty was concluded in such a manner that the boundary to the eastern ocean (meaning the Pacific Ocean--Author) was clearly stipulated, leaving only the Wuti River region near the Pacific shore to be negotiated. Besides, the boundary markers were promptly erected for inspection by both sides once every year."** The Soviet revisionists' attempt to hoodwink public opinion and to obliterate objective facts will prove absolutely futile.

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* Bakluzin, "The History of Colonial Siberia in the 16th and 17th Centuries," carried in "Collected Works of Bakluzin," Vol. III, Part 1, 1955 Moscow edition, p. 156.

** "Eastern Siberia," compiled by Poloslo, 1920 London edition, pp. 23-24.

The first clause in the "Nipuchu Treaty" stipulates that the Sino-Russian boundary begins with the source of the Gorbitsa River and follows its mountain range "to the sea." "The areas south of the mountain range including all large and small rivers that empty into the Heilung River should be under China's jurisdiction; areas and rivers north of it should belong to Russia." This fully shows that the said mountain range, which is regarded as the main marker delineating the eastern section of the Sino-Russian boundary, refers to the watershed between the two major river systems--the Heilung River and the Lena River. This watershed means that the east to west running Outer Khingan Mountain Range (Stanovoy Range in Russian) "extends all the way to the sea," which means the Sea of Okhotsk. Some objective Tsarist Russian scholars once acknowledged that based on the "Nipuchu Treaty," the Sino-Russian "boundary follows the Argun River and the Gorbitsa River, a tributary of the Shilka River, and continues eastward along the watershed between the Lena River valley and the Heilung River."* Even "17th Century Russia-China Relations" by Shepinkov published in 1960 acknowledged: "On the basis of the first clause in the 'Nipuchu Treaty,' the boundary between Russia and China follows the Gorbitsa River and the Stanovoy Range, which begins with the upper reaches of the Gorbitsa River and ends in where the Wuti River empties into the Sea of Okhotsk."** The aforementioned book by Poloslo also states: "In the 1689 'Nipuchu Treaty,' the Russians recognized that the Chinese boundary runs along the ridge of the Stanovoy Range about 200 miles (amounting to more than 320 kilometers--Author) north of the Heilung River until it reaches the Sea of Okhotsk near the Wuti River."*** Now, the Soviet revisionists, ignoring the clear provision taking the above-mentioned watershed as the boundary, insist that since the Outer Khingan Mountain Range has many branches," it is impossible to determine which branch is taken as the boundary," according to the "Nipuchu Treaty." Then they contradict themselves by asserting that on the basis of this treaty, China and Russia "should take the mountain range closest to the Heilung River as the boundary." Let us ask: Is the provision of the "Nipuchu Treaty" on the direction of the Outer Khingan Mountain Range "ambiguous" or do you deliberately distort the provision in order to create confusion?

The Soviet revisionists also preposterously state that the Stanovoy Range runs southward from a point near the upper reaches of the Wuti River and passes through the Heilung River and the Sungari River across the Korean border into the Sea of Japan. The Soviet revisionists arbitrarily argue that on the basis of the "Nipuchu Treaty," "the areas east and south of the Wuti River, including the whole of the lower reaches of the Heilung River and the coastal regions have not been delineated." This is another attempt to cheat the public. As a matter of fact, the "treaty" stipulated

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* Davydov, op. cit., p. 15.

** Shepinkov, op. cit., p. 207.

*** Edited by Poloslo, op. cit., p. 20.

that areas that should be left unsettled and negotiated separately were confined only to areas between the Outer Khingan Mountain Range and the Wuti River. But the Soviet revisionists have expanded the areas to be negotiated to include the whole of the lower reaches of the Heilung River and land east of the Wusuli River. Furthermore, according to their prefabricated direction of the Outer Khingan Mountain Range, would not the eastern part of China's Heilungkiang Province today also become areas to be negotiated? The malicious fallacy is entirely a repetition of the hackneyed tune sung by the mid-19th century Tsarist Russian aggressor Nevelskoy. At that time, the Tsarist Russian aggressors consistently regarded Nevelskoy's shocking "discovery" as an important basis for them to distort the "Nipuchu Treaty" at will and to make wild territorial claims on China. However, such fanciful allegation ignores the most rudimentary geographical knowledge, and even the Russian scholars who had the slightest respect for facts described it as "something hard to believe."* Another Soviet historian, Kamanin, who wrote a biography of Nevelskoy, also pointed out: "As we know today, Nevelskoy's ideas are groundless. This is because there is simply no unitary mountain range from the upper reaches of the Wuti River to Korea, nor are there any sharp bands from the Stanovoy Range as he had stated."** This comment strongly refutes the shameless lies by Nevelskoy and his successors, exposing their ugly features.

Even more inconceivable is the deceptive and false statement by the Soviet revisionists that on the basis of the "Nipuchu Treaty," the boundary mountain range between China and Russia is not the Outer Khingan Mountain Range, but the Great Khingan Mountain Range south of the Heilung River! According to this theory, a large chunk of northeastern China today, so it seems, should be incorporated within Russian territory. But, however mighty the Soviet revisionists are, they can never move the Outer Khingan Mountains to the south of the Heilung River. Their shameless cries only further expose the expansionist ambitions of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism.

The Gorbitsa River is another important marker showing the direction of the eastern section of the Sino-Russian boundary. A farce has also been staged by the Soviet revisionists to change this section of the boundary. Lurking behind this farce is an attempt to prove the "ambiguity" of the provisions of the "Nipuchu Treaty" so that these can be explained in whatever way they like as being not legally binding. In fact, this is not a new invention of theirs. As early as the 18th century, the reactionary Tsarist Russian historian Miler (米勒尔) attempted to describe the Amazar River which empties into the Heilung River, as the Great Gorbitsa River. In his

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* "The Heilungkiang River Area," compiled by the Local Autonomy Committee of Imperial Russia, 1909 Moscow edition, p. 50.

** Nevelskoy, op. cit., p. 19.

opinion, proceeding from Russian interests, it was best to regard the Amazar River as the Sino-Russian boundary. Playing parrots, the Soviet revisionists now contend that according to the "Nipuchu Treaty," the Sino-Russian boundary line should be defined by the Amazar River. Lust has blinded their eyes.

The Gorbitsa River is clearly stipulated by the "Nipuchu Treaty" as the Sino-Russian boundary. This river empties into the Shilka River near the Chorna River, and there can be no other explanation. First, maps published by the Tsarist Russian authorities explicitly regard the Gorbitsa River as the Sino-Russian boundary. For example, in Map No. 3 "Siberia" contained in the "Atlas of the Asian Portion of Russia" (drawn by Leymitsov in 1701) published by the Russian Immigration Bureau, the term "boundary" was clearly marked near the Gorbitsa River, which empties into the Shilka River. Second, when the Gorbitsa River was first proposed by the delegation of the Ch'ing Dynasty on August 26, 1989 as the boundary, it meant the Gorbitsa River which empties into the Shilka River. In his report to the Tsar, the Russian chief delegate Golovin confirmed this fact, and wrote: "This Gorbitsa River is located right in the middle between Nipuchu and Yaksa."* Taking a look at a map, one will see that the location of that river as recorded by Golovin is precisely that of the Gorbitsa River that empties into the Shilka River. Third, the Gorbitsa River, which the Russian side accepted as the national boundary, distinctly refers to the Gorbitsa River which flows into Shilka River and not that Amazar River near Yaksa. For example, on September 5 and 6, the two treaties drafts they submitted stated: "The Gorbitsa which flows from the left into the Shilka River near the Chorna River shall be designated as the boundary line between the two countries."** The first sentence of the first clause of the Russian text of the Nipuchu Treaty reads the same; not a single word was changed. Fourth, the Soviet revisionists also say that since the Latin text of the "Nipuchu Treaty" refers to the Chorna River as flowing into the Heilung River, therefore the Gorbitsa River located near that River and serving as national boundary should not be the Gorbitsa River that flows into the Shilka River but rather the Gorbitsa that flows into the Heilung River, namely, the Amazar River. Nothing can be more absurd than this. As everyone knows, before the 19th century, China had always regarded the Shilka River as part of the Heilung River. Chinese official documents and maps (such as the K'ang-hsi map, the Ch'ien-lung map and the Tao-Kuang map) have all along regarded the Shilka River as the main part of Heilung River on its upper reaches. Therefore, the Heilung River in the text of the treaty precisely meant the Shilka River. For another example, "Memoirs Beyond the Heilung River" says, "The Heilung River originates from Kengte (墾特) Mountain of the Khalkha tribe, Mongolia. Its upper reache is called Olun River in Mongolia, and written in other books as the Onon River, namely the Kanan River in the history of the Yuan Dynasty. It

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* "Documents on 17th Century Russo-Chinese Relations," Vol. II, p. 527.

** Ibid, pp. 563, 574.

was here that the first emperor of Yüan rose to power. It flows northeastward, passes through the southern part of Nipuchu city, enters the northeastern part of the province where it joins with the Argun River, turns southeastward past Yaksa....and enters the sea."* Furthermore, the diaries of Hsü Jih-sheng (徐日升) and Chang Ch'eng (张诚), interpreters for the Chinese side at the Nipuchu talks, clearly state that Nipuchu was located on the northern bank of the Heilung River.** Even the Tsarist scholar Fischer asserted that the Shilka River and the Heilung River were one single river.*** These constitute clear proof that the Heilung River included the Shilka River at that time. Can the Soviet revisionists with their skilful tongues change these objective facts?

In short, Tsarist Russia was always the aggressor while China was the victim of aggression in the history of early Sino-Russian relations. To protect national sovereignty, the Ch'ing government resolutely resisted Russian intrusions and prompted the holding of the Nipuchu meeting. The "Nipuchu Treaty" was a solemn document signed after talks were held on the basis of equality and was beneficial to Russia. It was never imposed by China through the use of force and was in no way detrimental to Russian sovereignty. The Sino-Russian boundary on the eastern section defined in the "Treaty" is clearcut and specific; it is not ambiguous and cannot be misinterpreted. To embellish the Tsarist Russian aggressors by covering up their crimes of swallowing large tracts of Chinese territory in the Northeast in violation of the treaty in the latter half of the 19th century, and to create a "basis" for their claims on Chinese territory, the Soviet revisionists have openly and audaciously harped on the same old tunes of the old Tsar and flagrantly distorted the background to the "Nipuchu Treaty" as well as the proceedings of the talks and the basic character of the treaty, denied the legal validity of the "Nipuchu Treaty," and arbitrarily changed the location of mountains and rivers serving as boundary as stipulated in the "Treaty." The historical truth cannot be distorted, nor can lies and sophistry substitute for facts. The more Soviet revisionists try to confuse black and white, the more thoroughly their features in falsifying history will be exposed!

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* Hsi Ch'ing (西清), "Memoirs beyond the Heilung River," Vol. I.

** Serbes, op. cit. p. 201; Hald, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 308.

*** See op. cit. edited by Pateley, Vol. I, p. 141.

On the Historical Lessons of Restoration in Ch'i of the Warring States Period

by

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(Li-shih Yen-chiu /Historical Research/, No. 2, April 20, 1975)

Following the successive introduction of political reform in the seven states of the early Warring States period, there gradually emerged a situation of confrontation between two powerful states -- Ch'i and Ch'in. In both states the newly emerging landlord classes and their statesmen, military men and thinkers had wanted to accomplish the cause of feudal unification of the divided country through military action by taking their own state as the base and following the line of "rule of law." But the results achieved by the two states were totally different. Ch'in's "rule of law" line continued to win and develop in the struggle against restoration, ending with Ch'in Shih Huang completing the unification and founding the first feudal empire in Chinese history. On the other hand, Ch'i's "rule of law" line, having achieved major successes at one time, was gradually overwhelmed by the restorationist line. Why is it that the restorationist line was pushed so easily in Ch'i after major successes were scored by the "rule of law" line? This deserves our serious thought. It is necessary for us to analyze clearly the historical process of the struggle for and against restoration in the state of Ch'i and the characteristics of the various stages of this struggle, and to use Marxism to sum up the historical experience and lessons of the Confucian-Legalist struggle and of class struggle as a whole so as to serve the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I

Ch'i was originally a principality set up in the northern part of present-day Shantung in the first year of Western Chou. The assumption of power by the T'ien clan in the last year of the Spring and Autumn period was a tremendous victory of historical significance won by the newly emerging landlord class. Ch'i was one of the earliest states to enter into feudal society. However, after seizing power, T'ien Ch'eng-tzu (T'ien Ch'ang) met with considerable resistance from the old aristocracy, as evidenced by the fierce struggle between the two lines. It was only after the struggle had continued for more than 120 years and political reform was initiated by King Wei that a major victory was won by the "rule of law" line and the state became strong and rich.

When King Wei ascended the throne (in 356 B.C.), acute line struggles went on everywhere, from central to local. The chief administrator of Ah (northeast of Yangku in present-day Shantung) was the representative of the restorationist line. In the area under his control, "fields were untended and the people were impoverished." Engaged in building an independent kingdom, he was completely indifferent to the invasion of neighboring cities by foreign enemies. However, some people praised him before the king. The chief administrator of Chimo

(southeast of P'ingtu of present-day Shantung) was the representative of the "rule of law" line. In the area under his control, "fields were put to the plow and people were adequately fed"; and "tranquility prevailed in the east." However, in the presence of the king, some people "defamed" him with "increasing vehemence." ("The T'ien Clan, Historical Records") This showed the extreme acuteness of the line struggle and the extreme rampancy of the restorationist forces in Ch'i in those days.

A landlord class statesman with strong will power, King Wei of Ch'i claimed that he followed the example set by the Yellow Emperor and inherited the hegemonic causes of Duke Huan of Ch'i and Duke Wen of Tsin. On his ascension to the throne, faced with the grave line struggle, he calmly observed and surveyed the scene for three years before ordering all the local officials throughout the state to come to see him. While in court, he rewarded the chief administrator of Chimo with the tax revenues collected from "ten thousand households" and ordered the execution of the chief administrator of Ah and his associates. This enforcement of the rule of law by the king, and his rewarding the deserving and punishing the wicked, shook the entire state.

In addition, King Wei appointed the Legalist Tsou Chi to be prime minister. "Playing a lute before King Wei," Tsou Chi explained with the rhythm of the lute the truth that the ruler and his prime minister should use laws and decrees to "govern the state and pacify the people." Three months later, King Wei appointed him prime minister charged with the implementation of the "rule of law" line. Since a correct political line had to be guaranteed by a correct organizational line, Tsou Chi paid much attention to giving official appointments to the right persons, besides trimming the bureaucracy "in order to prevent it from interfering with the people's livelihood." ("New Order," Vol. II) More important, Tsou Chi "prudently devised laws and put evil officials under surveillance." ("The T'ien Clan, Historical Records") He used the power vested with him by the dictatorship of the landlord class to purge the landlord government of "evil officials" and to recruit efficient administrators, thereby quickly reversing the unfavorable situation which "leads the state to poverty" and, while consolidating the border defenses of the state, "further enriching the people." ("The Tactics of the Minister, Shuo Wan) King Wei highly valued this group of newly appointed officials, regarding them as pearls that "shine a thousand miles." ("The T'ien, Clan, Historical Records") Streamlining the bureaucracy gave impetus to the further implementation of the "rule of law" line.

King Wei's successful reform was attributable mainly to his paying more serious attention to the struggle in the political and ideological spheres. A large building was erected to house an academy in Lintzu (which is now known as Lintzu of Shantung), the capital of Ch'i. Freelancing scholars were invited to join the academy and were given the treatment of senior officers. They were allowed to write, teach, discuss politics and offer counsel to the ruler of the state if and when requested. Among these "academicians," Chunyu Kun was the most important and occupied the first place. He was known to have "wide knowledge and a retentive memory and belong to no particular school of thought." (Mencius and Hsün Ch'ing, Historical Records") As a matter of fact, there were no scholars

who "belonged to no particular school of thought" in the course of the sharp struggle between the two lines. Chunyu Kun was an outstanding progressive thinker inclined to the Legalist school and opposed to the Confucian. He had twice denounced Meng K'o /Mencius/ to his face, accusing him of not giving a helping hand to those who were drowning. (Li Lou Part I, Mencius") Later, he again accused Meng K'o of failing to accomplish anything after becoming a high-ranking official of Ch'i. He thought that Duke Mou of Lu had his state weakened by giving important appointments to such Confucianists as Kung I-hsiu and Tzu Ssu, showing that the Confucianists "did nothing good to the state." Moreover, he exposed the Confucianists as swindlers, saying that the Confucianists who "accept jobs but perform no merit" should not be considered "worthy." ("Kaotzu Part II, Mencius") It was indeed something extraordinary that Chunyu Kun, born into a family no better than that of a slave, enjoyed the confidence of King Wei and on many occasions his proposals were accepted by the king and Tsou Chi with alacrity.

The ideological line is the theoretical basis of the political line. It was precisely because King Wei followed a pro-Legalist, anti-Confucian ideological line that the smooth implementation of the "rule of law" line was assured.

Chairman Mao says: "War itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character." ("On Protracted War") King Wei's military line served nothing but his "rule of law" line. He gave important appointments to such Legalists as Sun Pin and T'ien Chi. Sun Pin's work, "Sun Pin's Art of War" (bamboo slips unearthed from Han tombs in Lin-i, Shantung), was a splendid work propounding the Legalist military line at that time. Sun Pin held that the aim of war was to stabilize one's state and then to proceed to build a unified feudal dynasty in order to protect the lives of the broad masses of the people. He criticized the Confucianist military line, for he believed that only "one who became strong through success in war" could make "the world submit," and that nothing could be accomplished by merely relying on "practicing benevolence and righteousness or playing music." War was the only means to settle problems, he said. ("Seeing King Wei, Sun Pin's Art of War") Thanks to such a Legalist military line, major victories were won first in the battle of Kueiling and then in the battle of Maling. This forced King Hui of Wei to come to Hsu-chou (southeast of T'eng hsien, Shantung) to pay homage to King Wei as his "king," while the latter allowed him to retain the title of "king." This was known as the "Hsuchou affair," which took place in 334 B.C. The "Historical Records" says: "At that time, Ch'in used Lord Shang and the state became strong economically and militarily; Ch'u and Wei used Wu Ch'i and defeated the weak enemies; King Wei and King Hsüan of Ch'i used Master Sun, T'ien Chi and the like, and the various princes turned east to pay homage to Ch'i." Ch'i became a powerful state in the Kuantung region.

II

The "Hsuchou affair" marked the height of power of the state of Ch'i, but at the same time it also marked the beginning of the state's decline. King Wei and Tsou Chi lost their vigilance in face of the

major victories won. Misled by the slave-owning noble Kungsun Yüeh, Tsou Chi caused disharmony among generals and ministers, forcing T'ien Chi and Sun Pin to flee to the state of Ch'u after the victory of the battle of Maling. The Legalist leadership group was split. At the time of the "Hsuchou affair," King Wei, under the direction of the slave-owning noble T'ien Ying, gleefully "received" King Hui of Wei, who arrived in a condescending manner. The major military victories won in external wars introduced an element of complacency into the leadership group of Ch'i, causing it to abandon further reform and adopt a hands-off policy toward the remnant old system and old forces. Therefore, from the late years of King Wei to the early years of King Hsüan (334-310 B.C.), restorationist currents were continually stirred up, gradually prevailing over the "rule of law" line.

King Wei failed to carry out the reform with the same thoroughness that characterized the Shang Yang reform in the state of Ch'in, where a series of reform measures aimed at destroying the old and building the new were taken in the economic, political and cultural spheres and the aristocrats who resisted the rule of law and tried their best to restore the old order were firmly suppressed. As a result, formidable forces under the slave system existed in Ch'i. This was manifested mainly in the following three respects:

First, economically, remnants of the Chingt'ien farming system still existed and a large number of slave-owners were still around in industry and commerce.

The Chingt'ien system served as the basis for the relations of production under the slave system in the agricultural sector. At that time, remnants of the Chingt'ien system were still solidly preserved in Ch'i, a situation that did not exist in the state of Ch'in. As a result of the Shang Yang reform, Ch'in had abolished the Chingt'ien system, removed the markers separating the fields, and changed a mow unit of a hundred steps "into a unit of 240 steps." ("T'ung Tien, Vol. 174) Thus, the more thorough destruction of the basis of the relations of production under the slave system in the agricultural sector was followed by the establishment of the system of landownership by landlords, thereby basically solving the issue of ownership. But reforms were far from being thorough in the six states to the east, and in many places the Chingt'ien structure with "a mow unit consisting of a hundred steps" was still in existence. The chapter on "The Kingly System" in "Notes on Propriety," which was completed during the reign of Emperor Wen of Han, still called these fields "tung t'ien" (or eastern fields), and people of later generations thought that "tung t'ien" referred to "fields bordering on Ch'in in the west," "reminiscent of the Chingt'ien system." ("Differences and Similarities of the Farming Systems" in Huang I-chou's "Talks on Propriety," Vol. II)* At that time, an official

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* "An Explanation of the Term Tung T'ien of 'Kingly System'" in Yü Cheng-hsieh's "Collected Manuscripts," Vol. III, had discussed this point, concluding that this kind of "tung t'ien" was completely abolished only during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han.

document of Ch'i, "Inquiries on Work," still made reference to the existence of the Chingt'ien structure.* Thus, the preservation of the remnants of the Chingt'ien system in the state of Ch'i facilitated the efforts of the remaining slave-owners to revive the slave system.

At this time, moreover, social reforms had given a greater impetus to the development of the already relatively developed industry and commerce in Ch'i. Salt, ironwares, silk knitwear and other articles produced among the people were very popular and in great demand. But Ch'i, unlike Ch'in with the Shang Yang reform, did not take steps to develop agriculture on a priority basis and to restrain commerce, nor did it take any measure to strike at and restrict the slave-owners operating in industry and commerce. As a result of this, the further development of industry and commerce provided the slave-owners concerned with the conditions to expand their positions and to make convenient use of cheap slave labor and "set the slaves to trade in fish and salt to make a profit for them." Up to the time of the Ch'in Dynasty and early Han, big slave-owners in industry and commerce still existed in this region which was formerly known as Ch'i. By exploiting slave labor, one called Tiao Chien "made tens of millions." ("The Money-Makers, Historical Records") While expanding their influence, the slave-owners in industry and commerce then again built up the already decadent slave-owner forces and turned them into an important class basis for the restoration of the slave system.

Second, Ch'i still retained vestiges of the slave system in its political institutions.

Ch'i had never set up the local system at the "prefectural level." Instead, it set up five "capitals." Apart from the state capital, the four "capitals" located in the border areas served as fortified cities for border defense. These five "capitals" all had standing armies, which were called "armies of five capitals" or "armies of five families." The chief officer of the "capital" took charge of both civil and military administration. This system was different from that of "prefectures" in other states (where there was only the conscription system) and could be used quite easily by slave-owning aristocrats to usurp military power. Consequently, by the time of King Hsüan and King Min of Ch'i, K'uang Chang, an associate of Meng K'o, was able to usurp the power to control "the armies of five capitals." In addition, Ch'i gave high-ranking officials "fields and houses" as emoluments, and when they left their posts "their fields and houses would be taken back." ("Li Lou Part II, Mencius") This system was also different from that of other states where officials were paid in grain. Besides, Ch'i still retained clan politics, whereby T'ien P'an, son of T'ien Ch'ang, once "made his brothers and clansmen great officers of capitals and cities of Ch'i." ("The T'ien Clan, Historical Records") Since the ruler of Ch'i often appointed members

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* The "Military Law," drafted by Ch'i at that time, still preserved the Chingt'ien system, taking each family as the unit for the computation of military taxes. See explanatory note "Military Law" in "Military Law, Propriety of Chou."

of his clan to important posts, the T'ien clan was able to wield considerable power and influence, and this, as Han Fei pointed out later, was the fundamental reason why Ch'i "was weak militarily and chaotic politically." Yet this was precisely what Meng K'o, spokesman of the slave-owning aristocracy, had energetically advocated when he said: "It is not difficult to be in politics provided that you don't offend the powerful families." These powerful families--those of the high-ranking officials of great clans--not only had enormous wealth but also had land exclusively reserved for them in the form of fief. Such political remnants of the slave system could be used easily by agents of slave-owners who infiltrated into the landlord government to restore the slave system. The solid existence of the old economic and political bases of the slave system and the adoption of the hands-off policy by the landlord government toward the remnants of the slave system thus provided the opportunity to the lingering slave-owning nobles to make their counter-assault in revenge. T'ien Ying, for one, was a careerist of the slave-owning nobles that emerged from the clan of the state ruler. Taking advantage of the split within the Legalist leadership group and of King Wei's complacency in face of victories, he succeeded Tsou Chi as prime minister in the year of the "Hsuchou affair." Resorting to tricks, he first usurped the financial power (including the power to check the taxes collected by officials at the end of each year) and engaged in speculation and profiteering. And so, "chaos ensued." ("Outer Discussions on the Right Part II, Han Fei Tzu") He not only "made tens of millions for himself," but, in the last year of King Wei (322 B.C.) further acquired Hsüeh (namely Hsuchou, southeast of T'eng hsien in present-day Shantung) as a fief, which became "a state within the state" split from the state of Ch'i, and called himself Lord Chingkuo or Duke Hsüeh.

Third, the existence of the influence of ideas of the slave-owning class and the uninhibited spread of the Confucian and Taoist doctrines which stood for the decadent slave-owners were the political and ideological root-causes of the restoration of the slave system in Ch'i at that time.

Although King Wei had pushed the ideological line that respected the Legalist school and opposed the Confucian, he did not, as called for by the Shang Yang reform, adopt resolute measures to subject the Confucians to scathing criticism and burn the Confucian classics. Soon after his ascension to the throne, King Hsüan made Ch'u Tzu prime minister and pushed the ideological line "extolling Confucianism and honoring learning." ("On Confucianism, On Salt and Iron") He allowed the Confucian and Taoist doctrines to spread unchecked, instantly bringing about the "resurgence of the academicians, who numbered up to a thousand." ("The T'ien Clan, Historical Records") Among the well-known scholars, apart from Chunyu Kun, were such Legalists as Shen Tao and Hsün K'uang, but most were Taoists. The Taoists favored the restoration of the old order and returning to the past; they advocated "rule by inactivity," letting things run their natural course. "Preaching the Taoist theory in Ch'i," T'ien P'ien publicized the view that "demands should vary with changes." ("Statecraft, the Spring and Autumn Annals of Master LÜ") This view exactly conformed to the needs of the slave-owning aristocrats who wormed their ways into the landlord political organs to usurp power and make the ruler a puppet.

As King Hsüan pushed a line "extolling Confucianism and honoring learning," Meng K'o, an important representative of the Confucians, was given an important appointment. A trumpeter for the restoration of the slave system, Meng K'o had particularly sensitive counter-revolutionary smell. Where there were buds of restoration, he would surely rush there. So, he twice went to Ch'i. When he first arrived there, the state was ruled by King Wei. He taught in the academy but, failing to "satisfy his ambition," he soon left it. When he visited Ch'i again, King Hsüan had just ascended to the throne. This time he found his "ambition fulfilled," having taken one of the three most senior ministerial posts in the state and being the only "academician" to be able to do so. King Hsüan had great respect for him, and once sent someone to observe him "whether he is really different from other men." ("Li Lou Part II, Mencius") While being received by King Hsüan on a number of occasions, Meng K'o appealed to him to restore the "kingly way" and "benevolent government," openly opposing the abolition of the hereditary privileges of the aristocracy and calling for the reinstitution of the system of "hereditary officials" of "former states." Why did he talk about only "benevolent government" and "kingly way" instead of the concrete affairs of the state? When asked by his disciples about this, he said: "I must first conquer his heart." ("General Strategy, Hsün Tzu") That is to say, he wanted to use his counter-revolutionary strategy of "attacking the heart" to change the guiding thought of King Hsüan before proceeding to radically alter Ch'i's political line and the nature of the regime.

With the growth of the restorationist forces in the economic, political and ideological spheres, their agents would naturally come forward and demand the overthrow of the dictatorship of the landlord class and wholesale restoration of the slave system. By the late years of King Hsüan (about 310 B.C.), although Meng K'o had left Ch'i, his "heart-attacking" strategy succeeded, and the system of "hereditary officials" of "former states" advocated by him was the first to be restored, with T'ien Wen, son of T'ien Ying, not only inheriting his father's fief and calling himself Lord Mengch'ang or Duke Hsüeh but also becoming the prime minister and usurping the power of Ch'i, "having under his control the ruler at the top and the people of the state below." ("A Strong State, Hsün Tzu") A situation was thus created in which "people knew only of T'ien Wen and not the King of Ch'i." ("Fan Sui, Historical Records") From then onward, the restorationist line became dominant in Ch'i.

III

The active implementation of the restorationist and splittist line by Lord Mengch'ang in the state caused this situation to appear: "The father and the elder brother broke the law" and "the state was beset with political chaos." ("Inner Discussions Part I, Han Fei Tzu") Confusion reigned everywhere. And Hsün Tzu regarded him /Mengch'ang/ as a typical example of "usurper ministers" who formed private gangs and plotted to usurp power. ("The Way of the Minister, Hsün Tzu")

With a view to achieving his aim of restoring the old order, Lord Mengch'ang fanatically pushed an organizational line of recruiting

turncoats and accepting traitors. He gathered more than three thousand people as his house guests, all of them were "men who had influence previously as well as refugees and felons flying from justice." In addition, he invited over sixty thousand families of "gallant men and outlaws" from far and wide to settle in Hsüeh. ("Lord Mengch'ang, Historical Records") These "refugees and felons," "gallant men and outlaws" as well as petty thieves were mostly criminals who had undermined the "rule of law" and were targets for the dictatorship of the landlord regime in other states. Why did Lord Mengch'ang take them all? One of his house guests by the name of Kungsun Hsü laconically revealed his master's criminal objective when he said that the purpose was "to help the poor to rise as this has the meaning of restoring families whose line of succession has been broken." ("Ch'i's Stratagem Part III, Stratagems of the Warring States") This in effect was directed at achieving the goal, as referred to by Confucius, of "reviving states that have been extinguished, restoring families whose line of succession has been broken, and calling to office those who have fallen into obscurity," of gathering once again the forces of the overthrown slave-owners in order to stage a coup d'etat, seize political power and restore the slave system in an all-round manner when the opportunity presented itself. Lord Mengch'ang might be said to be a fanatic practicer of the Confucian line of "restraining oneself and returning to propriety."

Externally, Lord Mengch'ang started a war aimed at implementing the restorationist line. He persuaded Han and Wei to launch a joint attack against Ch'u and Ch'in with the object of expanding the forces of the slave-owning aristocracy and consolidating his own power. But by doing so, he caused disasters to befall his state and people. "Stratagems of the Warring States" says: "For five years it /Ch'i/ attacked Ch'u in the south at the cost of using up all its grain reserves; in the west it besieged Ch'in for three years, and its people were impoverished and soldiers deserted." This brought Ch'i to the brink of extinction.

Lord Mengch'ang was a man of insatiable greed and a usurer. In Hsüeh, he might collect over a hundred thousand coins at one time as interest from usurious loans. At the same time, not satisfied with seizing the post of prime minister, he started an armed coup d'etat, which in history was known as "T'ien Chia kidnaps the king." T'ien Chia was also a noble, and "the kidnapping of the king" was carried out under the direction of Lord Mengch'ang with the aim of murdering King Min in order to restore the slave system wholesale. After the failure of the armed coup d'etat, he fled to the state of Wei. He then became the prime minister of Wei and prepared to take that state as a base for springing an attack on Ch'i in collusion with the restorationist forces of the slave-owners in the state of Ch'in in a bid to make a comeback.*

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* "The Historical Table of Dates and Events" in "Historical Records" records this event, saying: "T'ien Chia kidnapped the king and prime minister Hsüeh Wen fled." But "Lord Mengch'ang" in the same book "Historical Records" covers up this incident, saying that after Lord

Referring to this period of history, Fan Sui said: "The ministers stirred up such trouble that T'ien Tzu (T'ien Wen) had to flee," ("Fan Sui, Historical Records") and Su Ch'in said to King Min of Ch'i: "Your Majesty abandoned Duke Hsüeh, and that will spell your downfall." The latter's remarks were found in Chapter 8 of the silk book "Stratagems of the Warring States" unearthed from Mawangtsui. This incident amply demonstrated the fanaticism of the new aristocracy in restoring the old order at that time.

After Lord Mengch'ang's departure from Ch'i, King Min personally took charge of state affairs, yet, having failed to rectify the errors in line, he went on sliding down along the restorationist line. He continued to use such persons as Su Ch'in for important jobs and started a war to attack and destroy the state of Sung. He put to death those who dared to voice their "just opinions" and killed those of his own clan who dared to "speak out," in addition to having the noted general Ssuma Jang-chü murdered.* As a result, "the common people hated him"; "members of his clan wanted to leave him," and "the ministers did not like him." ("Ch'i's Stratagem Part VI, Stratagems of the Warring States") Moreover, prolonged warfare depleted the state's treasury and impoverished the people. At that time, many progressive thinkers of the academy left Ch'i one after another, seeing that "the court was without good ministers" and "the people led an unbearable life." "Shen Tao and Chief Tzu departed," and "Sun Ch'ing (Hsün Tzu) went over to Ch'u." ("On Confucianism, On Salt and Iron") From then on, the state of Ch'i, like the state of Lu, became an old nest of the Confucianists. In spite of Ch'i then looking still quite powerful, forcing "the rulers of Tsou and Lu and other princes to pay homage to Ch'i," and King Min himself still filled with the desire

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Mengch'ang flight, one of his house guests defended him and demonstrated his faith by committing suicide. It says that King Min ordered an investigation which proved "Lord Mengch'ang innocent." As a matter of fact, Lord Mengch'ang was not only the man behind the coup d'etat but, following his escape and irreconciled to his defeat, he had tried to talk Wei Jan, prime minister of Ch'in, into joining him in an attack on Ch'i, persuading him to "subjugate Ch'i and take it as his fief." (Ch'in's Stratagem Part III, Stratagems of the Warring States." Right at that time some had charged him with "turning his back on Hsüeh and being ungrateful to his former ruler." ("Stratagem of Eastern Chou, Stratagems of the Warring States")

* There were successively two persons by the name of Ssuma Jang-chü in the state of Ch'i. One was a famous general during the reign of Duke Ching of Ch'i in the Spring and Autumn period; see "Ssuma Jang-chü, Historical Records." The other was a noted general during the reign of King Min of Ch'i during the Warring States period; see "Ch'i's Stratagem Part VI, Stratagems of the Warring States." Since the Sung Dynasty some people had regarded the record about Ssuma Jang-chü in "Historical Records" as misrepresentation.

of "becoming the Son of Heaven," ("The T'ien Clan, Historical Records") the actual fact was that Ch'i had become a paper tiger unable to stand a single blow -- an inevitable result of many years' effort to push the restorationist line. In 284 B.C., Ch'i was finally conquered by the army led by Lo I of Yen, and almost perished. From then on, Ch'i remained weak until its eventual extinction.

Some ninety years passed between Lord Mengch'ang's rise to power and the final extinction of Ch'i. In these ninety years, prolonged implementation of the restorationist line created three evil results: One, the once powerful regime of the landlord class in Ch'i became regressive and finally went out of existence. Two, the T'ien clan, representating the newly emerging landlord class, degenerated into a slave-owning aristocracy. Up to the Ch'in-Han period, the T'iens of Ch'i, like the Chaos, Ch'Us, and Chings of the old aristocracy of Ch'u, had consistently been obstinate restorationist forces of slave-owners. That was why Liu Ching said: "When a prince first rose to power, he could not succeed unless he had the support of the T'iens of Ch'i or of the Chaos, Ch'Us, and Chings of Ch'u." ("Liu Ching, Historical Records") This source of evil was not basically eradicated until 198 B.C. when Liu Pang moved the more than a hundred thousand people of the T'ien clan of Ch'i and of the Chao, Ch'U, Ching and Huai clans of Ch'u to the Kuanchung region. Third, an advanced area in which the Legalist school emerged relatively early and developed relatively fast became an old nest of the Confucianists, a main base for manufacturing public opinion in favor of restoration, for bringing up reactionary Confucian scholars and for spreading Confucian classics. Later on, Dr. Chunyu Yueh who vigorously pleaded with Ch'in Shih Huang for restoring the system of granting fiefs was a native of Ch'i. Most of the well-known reactionary Confucian scholars in early Han were natives of Ch'i or Lu. Also, most of the people who began to spread the Confucian classics -- "Changes," "History," "Poetry," and "The Spring and Autumn Annals" -- were natives of Ch'i.* The two earliest editions -- "Analects of Ch'i" and "Analects of Lu" -- of the collection of Confucius' reactionary speeches, were also edited and circulated by the Confucisn scholars of Ch'i and Lu. These three evil results of restoration were grave, and we should seriously sum up such historical lessons.

History shows that even for a revolution which substituted one system of exploitation for another, the struggle between restoration and counter-restoration was extremely acute, with the restorationist forces making use of the remnants of the old system to stir up trouble in order to realize their scheme. Irreconciled to their defeat, they would surely put up a frenzied and desperate counter-offensive. Today we are carrying out a socialist revolution aimed at completely abolishing all exploiting

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* In early Han, T'ien Sheng who was the first to circulate the "Book of Changes," Fu Sheng, the "Book of History," Yüan Ku-sheng, the "Book of Poetry," and Hu Mu-sheng, the "Spring and Autumn Annals" were natives of Ch'i. See "The Confucian Scholars, History of Han."

classes and systems of exploitation, and we must eliminate the traces left behind by the old society. Without gradually destroying the old system and the old ideas that give expression to it and without gradually uprooting the soil and conditions giving rise to capitalism and revisionism, it will be impossible to overcome the danger that capitalism may be restored. It is for this reason that we must consciously adhere to the Party's basic line, persevere in all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, create the conditions in which it will be impossible for the bourgeoisie to exist, or for a new bourgeoisie to arise, and march triumphantly toward the great goal of communism.

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